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Abstract
Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine
who will play next (Lazarus et al., 1999). We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two
player games called bidding games, showing the existence of pure subgame-perfect equilibria
(PSPE). In particular, we show that PSPEs form a semilattice, with a unique and natural
Bottom Equilibrium.
Our main result shows that if only two actions available to the players in each node, then
the Bottom Equilibrium has additional properties: (a) utilities are monotone in budget; (b)
every outcome is Pareto-efficient; and (c) any Pareto-efficient outcome is attained for some
budget.
In the context of combinatorial bargaining, we show that a player with a fraction of X%
of the total budget prefers her allocation to X% of the possible allocations. In addition,
we provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the Bottom Equilibrium of a binary
bidding game.
JEL classification: C72; C78
Keywords: Extensive form games; Richman games; Combinatorial games; Bargaining
1. Introduction
Are game-theorists better at playing games? Game-theory and game-playing are often
considered to have distinct purposes and different sets of required skills. Exceptional points
of intersection are games that are both fun to play and possess interesting theoretical prop-
erties; among those, a particularly exquisite example is Bidding Chess.1 Unlike standard
Chess where turns are alternating among white and black, in the bidding version players
each start with a fixed budget, and bid at the beginning of each turn. The higher bidder has
the right to play next after paying her bid to the other player. It is thus possible for example
that a player will move 3 pieces before the other player makes a single move. Yet one needs
to carefully balance the bids for the different moves, or else she could lose too much of her
✩A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computa-
tion (EC-2015). The first author is supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) under Grant #773/16.
The second and third authors are supported by advanced ERC grants. Part of the research was performed
when all of the authors were affiliated with MSR Herzlia, Israel.
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1For rules and historical background, see (Bhat and Payne, 2009).
budget, leaving her unable to take advantage of her position in the game. Indeed, even the
bidding variation of the simple Tic-Tac-Toe game is non-trivial to play, and our personal
experience shows that often a game where one player seems to lead gets turned over.2
These bidding variations of popular recreational games are special cases of a wider class
of games known as Richman Games : A Richman game is very similar to a combinatorial
game (Albert et al., 2007), in that it consists of a directed graph of states (e.g. board states
of the Chess game), where states without outgoing edges assign victory either to the black
player or to the white player. In contrast to standard combinatorial games where turns
are alternating, a bidding game starts with an initial budget allocation, and in each turn
players bid for the right to play next. The higher bidder pays her bid to the lower bidder,
and chooses a directed edge to follow, until either a white or a black terminal is reached.
Richman games have been formally studied by Lazarus et al. (1999) (and later by Develin
and Payne (2010)), whose main contribution was a surprising connection with random-turn
games. See Section 8.1 for more details on Richman games and other variations of bidding
games.
However, a zero-sum game with bidding phases is still a zero-sum game, and to the best
of our knowledge, bidding games with general utility functions have not been previously
studied. In this work, we extend the model to general-sum two player games by adding
bidding phases to an arbitrary extensive form game. Whereas zero-sum games have a value
that each player can guaranty, when extending the definition to general-sum games we can
only talk about equilibrium. The standard solution concept studied in extensive-form game
is pure subgame-perfect equilibrium (PSPE), meaning that each player is playing a best-
response to the other player at any subtree of the game. Indeed, the purpose of this work is
to study the existence and properties of PSPE in general-sum bidding games. We highlight
that this is a natural extension of previous work on zero-sum games, since the value of a
zero-sum game is a special case of a PSPE outcome.
Other than the pure theoretical interest in such results, many social and economic inter-
actions can be formalized as two-player extensive form games. For example, we can consider
two agents bargaining over a set of heterogeneous items. Then any sequential bargaining
protocol is in fact an extensive form game (with complete information), where the utilities
for players are the respective values of the subsets of items they get in the end. Indeed,
several bargaining and arbitration protocols have been suggested in the literature, some of
them of a sequential nature (see Section 8.1). We can thus use bidding phases as above to
design a new bargaining mechanism called sequential scrip bargaining (SSB): The agents
each start with some fixed budget (reflecting their relative power or entitlement), and use
this budget to bid over items auctioned in some order. As mechanism design often deals
with efficiency and fairness of proposed mechanisms, it is natural to ask e.g. whether the
equilibrium outcomes of SSB correspond to efficient and/or fair allocations.
Paper structure and contribution. The definition of bidding games and some examples are
provided in Section 2. In Section 3, we show that under a mild assumption on tie-breaking,
every bidding game admits at least one PSPE. Further, the set of all PSPEs forms a meet-
semilattice, whose lowest point is termed the Bottom Equilibrium.
Our main result is given in Section 4, and it states that in any bidding game over a
binary tree (when at every stage of the game there are two possible actions), the Bottom
2Many hours of play have been dedicated in the sake of promoting science.
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Equilibrium can be computed by simulating an ascending auction. Further, it admits three
desirable properties: (a) each player’s utility is weakly monotone in her budget; (b) a Pareto-
efficient outcome is reached for any initial budget; and (c) for any Pareto-efficient outcome
there is an initial budget such that this outcome is attained. We complement this result by
showing that none of the above properties is guaranteed in non-binary trees. A key lemma
required for the main theorem shows that the Bottom Equilibrium has a simple structure
and is not sensitive to small budget fluctuations.
In Section 6 we analyze the properties of the SSB mechanism informally described above,
when the agents have arbitrary combinatorial valuations over items. As a direct corollary
from our main theorem, we get that the mechanism guarantees a Pareto-efficient allocation
for any valuation functions agents have over subsets of items. We further show that the
allocation is fair in the sense that an agent with a fraction of X% of the total budget prefers
her allocation to X% of the possible allocations, a criterion known as minimal satisfaction
test (De Clippel et al., 2012).
Finally, we prove in Section 7 that any binary bidding game can be solved in time that
is polynomial in the number of states, and show how such an algorithm can be used to
efficiently find the Bottom Equilibrium in SSBs with additive valuations and other succinct
representations of valuations.
2. Model
For an integer k, we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k} by [k]. Unless explicitly mentioned
otherwise, we assume that N = {1, 2}, i.e. that there are only two competing agents
(sometimes called players or bidders). We use the notation −i (instead of 3− i) to denote
the player that is not i. We name player 1 the white player, and player 2 the black player.
2.1. Bidding games
We first define the game structure that is common to combinatorial games, random-turn
games and bidding games. The bidding process which is unique to bidding games is defined
below.
Definition 1. An game structure is a tuple G = 〈S, s0, T, g1, g2, u1, u2〉, where:
• S is a set of game states;
• s0 ∈ S is the initial state;
• T ⊆ S is a set of terminal states;
• gi : (S \ T )→ 2S defines the optional moves of player i in state s ∈ S \ T ;
• ui : T → R defines the utility for player i in each terminal t ∈ T .
We make the following assumptions about the transition functions gi. First, unless
specified otherwise, we assume that there are no cycles. Formally, there is no sequence
s1, s2, . . . , sk where sk = s1 and sj+1 ∈ g1(sj)∪g2(sj) for all j < k. Second, unless specified
otherwise, we assume that in every non-terminal state both players can play. Formally, that
gi(s) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N, s ∈ S \T . The utility function ui induces a complete preference order
over terminals T (see also Sec. 3.2). We denote t i t′ whenever ui(t) ≥ ui(t′). Given a game
structure G and s ∈ S, we denote by G|s the subgame of G rooted in s. The height of s is the
maximal distance between s and a leaf t ∈ T (G|s). In particular, height(G) = height(s0).
The following two properties are structural properties of the underlying game tree/DAG:
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Definition 2. A game structure G is impartial, if g1(s) = g2(s) for all s ∈ S. That is, if
the same set of moves is available to both players in every state.
Unless specified otherwise, all games in this paper are impartial. In impartial games we
only need to specify one transition function g(s).3
Definition 3. A game structure G is binary, if |g(s)| ≤ 2 for all s ∈ S \ T .
Playing a bidding game. In order to complete the definition of a game, we also need a method
to determine who plays at every turn. Traditionally, there is a turn function that assigns the
current player for every state (e.g., alternating turns in Nim and other combinatorial games).
Another way is to randomly select the current player in each turn, as in (Peres et al., 2007).
In this work we follow the bidding framework of (Lazarus et al., 1999; Develin and Payne,
2010), where each player has an initial budget Bi that is used for the bidding. The higher
bidder pays her bid to the lower bidder, so that the total budget B1 + B2 = 1 is constant
throughout the game.
We begin with an informal description of the strategies and an example.
In each turn (suppose at state s), each player submits a bid bi ≤ Bi, and a “next state”
s∗i ∈ g(s), which is realized in case i wins the round. We break ties in favor of player 1.
Then the winner (say, i∗) pays her bid to the loser −i∗ and the game proceeds from state
s∗i∗ with the modified budgets Bi∗ − bi∗ , B−i∗ + bi∗ .
We consider both discrete and continuous bids. Finite resolution means that all bids
and budgets are multiples of ǫ = 1
R′
for some integer R′. We say that ǫ is high resolution if
R′ = R · 2k where k = height(G) and R ≥ 4 is an even integer. In particular it means that
1
ǫ
is at least exponential in the height of the tree. Throughout most of the paper, we will
assume a high finite resolution. Later in Sections 4.3 and 5 we consider the consequences of
small and infinite resolutions, respectively.
For a given ǫ, we denote by Bǫ = {(B1, B2) s.t. B1 + B2 = 1, and B1ǫ ,
B2
ǫ
∈ N} the set
of possible budget partitions. We omit the subscript ǫ when clear from context. Since in
either case the total budget is fixed, B2 can always be inferred from B1 and vice versa. We
therefore identify Bǫ with {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . , 1} and use either B1 or B2 to denote a particular
budget partition.
Definition 4. A (discrete) bidding game is a pair 〈G, ǫ〉, where G is a game structure as
per Def. 1, and ǫ = 1
R′
(for some integer R′) is the resolution of budgets and bids.
Note that a bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉 is in fact a collection of 1
ǫ
+ 1 different games, one for
every initial budget partition B1 = 0, ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . , 1.
Example—Majority. Consider the following (zero-sum) game structure Gmaj, depicted in
Figure 1. In this game there are at most three turns, and the winner is the player which plays
at least twice. Formally, S = ({0, 1, 2}×{0, 1, 2})\{(2, 2)}, and an element in S is simply the
number of times that each player played; s0 = (0, 0); T = {(s1, s2) ∈ S : s1 = 2 ∨ s2 = 2};
g(si, s−i) = {(si + 1, s−i), (si, s−i + 1)} for all s ∈ S \ T ; and ui(t) = 1 if ti = 2 and 0
otherwise.
3Chess for example is not an impartial game since different moves are available to black and white.
Partial zero-sum games are discussed in Section 8.1, however for acyclic zero-sum games partiality does not
matter (Develin and Payne, 2010).
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0, 0
1, 0
0, 1
1, 1
2, 0
2, 1
0, 2
1, 2
Figure 1: The game Gmaj. White wins in white terminals, black wins in black. Double arrows mark the
game play in the example.
Note that if Gmaj is played with alternating turns and without budgets or bidding, the
white player can always win. Consider 〈Gmaj, ǫ〉 with ǫ = 1800 , and B1 = B2 = 0.5, i.e.
where each player has an initial budget of 0.5.
The following is a possible game play:
• In turn 1, white bids 0.2 and black bids 0.15. White gains the turn, plays the round,
and the new budgets are 0.3 and 0.7. s = (1, 0).
• In turn 2, white bids 0.14 and black bids 0.26. Black plays and pays 0.26. s = (1, 1),
and budgets are updated to (0.56, 0.44).
• In the last turn, both players exhaust their budgets, so the player with higher re-
maining budget (white with 0.56 vs. black with only 0.44) plays and wins the game.
s = (2, 1) ∈ T .
Note that a higher budget makes it easier to win in this game. For example, if Bi >
3(B−i + ǫ) for some player, then player i can always gain the first two rounds by bidding
more than the other player’s budget.
Strategies. We next define the allowed strategies for players in bidding games, and the main
solution concept we apply.
Definition 5. A strategy profile in a bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉 is a mapping
γ : S × B → N × (B)2 × B × S2 × T,
where B = Bǫ and γ(s,B1) specifies the actions taken in state s under budget partition
(B1, B2) (recall that B1 +B2 = 1 so the partition is determined by a single parameter).
More specifically, for all s ∈ S,B1 ∈ B, γ(s,B1) = (i∗, b1, b2, B∗i∗ , s
∗
1, s
∗
2, t), where: i
∗
is the winner; b1 and b2 are the bids of both players; B∗i∗ is the remaining budget of the
winner; s∗i is the next state chosen by each i; and t ∈ T (also denoted by γ(·)T ) is the
outcome. While some of these elements can be inferred from others, the ability to reference
them directly will become useful later on.
Definition 6. γ is a valid strategy profile if for all s ∈ S \ T and B1 ∈ B, γ(s,B1) =
(i∗, b1, b2, B
∗
i∗ , s
∗
1, s
∗
2, t) holds the following consistency constraints:
• b1 ≤ B1 and b2 ≤ B2.
• i∗ = 1 if b1 ≥ b2 and otherwise i∗ = 2. That is, highest bidder wins the round with
ties broken in favor of white.
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• B∗i∗ = Bi∗ − bi∗ . That is, the winner pays her bid to the other player.
• s∗1, s
∗
2 ∈ g(s).
• t = γ(s∗i∗ , B
∗
i∗)T . That is, players reach to the same terminal from state s and from
the next state s∗i∗ .
For a terminal t ∈ T we define γ(t, B1) = (1, 0, 0, B1, t, t, t) in every valid strategy.
We denote by Γ(G, ǫ) the set of all valid profiles in the bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉.
2.2. Subgame perfect equilibria
Definition 7. A strategy profile γ is a pure subgame perfect equilibrium (PSPE) in a
bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉, if it is a valid strategy profile, and each player plays a best-response
strategy to the other player at any subtree, for any budget.
We denote by Γ∗(G, ǫ) ⊆ Γ(G, ǫ) the set of all PSPEs in bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉.
Since there are many possible responses of a player in a given strategy profile, we use
the following lemma to specify all of them explicitly. The proof is immediate, by noticing
that the lemma covers all possible selections of bids and states.
Lemma 1. A valid strategy profile γ is a PSPE in the bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉 if and only if
the following incentive constraints hold for all s ∈ S \ T and B1 ∈ B (where player i∗ is the
winner in γ(s,B1)):
• For any s′i∗ ∈ g(s) and any b
′
i∗ ∈ B s.t. b
′
i∗ ≤ Bi∗ , b
′
i∗ > b−i∗ (weak inequality when
i∗ = 1), it holds that ui∗(t) ≥ ui∗(γ(s′i∗ , Bi∗ − b
′
i∗)T ). That is, the winner i
∗ cannot
gain by still winning the turn and use a different bid and/or action.
• For any s′−i∗ ∈ g(s) and any b
′
−i∗ ∈ B s.t. b
′
−i∗ ≤ B−i∗ , b
′
−i∗ > bi∗ (weak inequality
when i∗ = 2), it holds that u−i∗(t) ≥ u−i∗(γ(s′−i∗ , Bi∗ + b
′
−i∗)T ). That is, the loser
−i∗ cannot gain by increasing his bid and win the turn.
• ui∗(t) ≥ ui∗(γ(s∗−i∗ , Bi∗ + b−i∗)T ). That is, the winner i
∗ cannot gain by lowering her
bid and losing the turn (does not apply if i∗ = 1 and b2 = 0). Note that that the next
state selected by the loser (s∗−i∗) must be part of the description of the strategy.
We emphasize that a strategy profile determines the actions and outcome for any budget
partition in any internal node, and in particular for any initial budget partition. For each
s ∈ S \T denote µs(B1) = γ(s,B1)T . Therefore, every profile γ for 〈G, ǫ〉 induces a mapping
µγ from Bǫ to outcomes T (G). That is, µγ(B1) = γ(s0, B1)T . We say that the profiles γ, γ′
are outcome-equivalent in 〈G, ǫ〉 if γ(s,B1)T = γ′(s,B1)T for all s ∈ S,B1 ∈ Bǫ.
3. Existence and Structure of Equilibria
We start by showing the following basic result. For s ∈ S \ T , denote by γ|s the profile
γ on the subtree rooted in s. Clearly if γ is a PSPE then so is γ|s.
Theorem 2. Any bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉 has a PSPE, i.e. Γ∗(G, ǫ) 6= ∅.
Further, if for all sj ∈ g(s0) there is a PSPE γ(j) in
〈
G|sj , ǫ
〉
, then there is a PSPE γ′
in 〈G, ǫ〉 s.t. for all sj ∈ g(s0), γ′|sj = γ
(j).
Intuitively, we construct such an equilibrium by traversing the game tree bottom-up,
where in each node the players simulate an ascending auction (for every possible budget)
to determine the equilibrium bids. We emphasize that in the actual bidding game bids are
simultaneous, but we use an ascending auction in order to determine the equilibrium bids.
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3.1. Existence of PSPE
Let a first-price game be a two-player one-shot game of the following form: each player
submits a bid bi ∈ B, and the utilities of both players (denoted u1 and u2) are an arbitrary
function of the higher bid.
Given a bid profile (b1, b2), a better-reply of player i is a bid b′i that results in a strictly
better outcome, i.e., such that ui(max{b′i, b−i}) > ui(max{bi, b−i}).
Lemma 3. Consider any sequence of alternating better-replies in a first-price game. Then
after the first time a bidder raises her bid, no bidder ever lowers her bid.
Proof. Recall that tie-breaking is in favor of bidder 1. Suppose that at some step bidder 1
increases her bid from (b1, b2) to b′1. Note that b
′
1 ≥ b2, as otherwise b1 < b
′
1 < b2 and
(b1, b2); (b
′
1, b2) lead to the same outcome (if the first increase is by bidder 2 then b
′
2 > b1).
Any further step of bidder 1 must keep b′1 ≥ b2, otherwise we just go back to the outcome
of (b1, b2) (which is weakly worse for bidder 1).
Consider the next reply by bidder 2—he must also increase his bid to some b′2 > b
′
1 ≥ b2
in order to have any effect. Then bidder 1 must increase again and so on. Thus no bidder
ever reduces her bid (after the first increase).
Let 〈G, ǫ〉 be a bidding game, (s,B1) be some state and budget, and γ = (γj)sj∈g(s) be
some action profile in all the subgames G|sj . We observe that 〈G, ǫ〉 , (s,B1) and γ together
induce a first-price game played in state (s,B1):
− In each sj consider the mapping µj : B → T (G);
− For every B∗i ∈ Bǫ, let s
∗
i (B
∗
i ) ∈ argmaxsj∈g(s) ui(µj(B
∗
i )), i.e., the best selected state
for i under remaining budget B∗i ;
− For every b1 ≥ b2, the outcome is t∗ = µs∗
1
(B1−b1)(B1 − b1) ∈ T (G), and thus utilities
u1(t
∗), u2(t
∗) are only determined by the higher bid b1. Similarly when b2 > b1.
We denote this first-price game by G(ǫ, s, B1,γ).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let k = height(G). We prove by induction on the height of the tree.
The base case is trivial since in a tree of height 0, S \ T is empty.
We first set the next states players select in s. Let g(s) = {s1, . . . , sq}. By the induction
hypothesis, for each subgame G|sj there is some PSPE γ
(j). This defines a first-price game
G(ǫ, s, B1,γ) played in state (s,B1), where γ = (γ(j))sj∈g(s).
Suppose we initialize both bids to 0. By Lemma 3, bids can only increase. Thus
there is only a finite number of bid increments, from any initial state.4 We then set
the bids in γ′(s,B1) to be the equilibrium bids of the first-price game, and action s∗i =
argmaxsj∈g(s) ui(µsj (Bi − bi)) for i ∈ {1, 2}. We complete the definition of γ
′ by setting
γ′|sj = γ
(sj).
4This uses the fact that there is only a finite number of possible bids. In the continuous case there are
some caveats, see Section 5.
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s0 x y
(2, 2) ∗ ∗ (5, 5) ∗
(1, 9)
(9, 1)
Figure 2: The game Gtwo. Note that utilities are generic.
3.2. Genericity and uniqueness
Generic games are games where agents have strict preferences over all outcomes. In
classical extensive-form games (without bidding), it is known that genericity entails the
existence of a unique PSPE. However in our game there are simultaneous steps, and thus
genericity may not be sufficient for uniqueness.
Our next example shows that in the general case, there might be multiple PSPEs that
are not outcome-equivalent.
Proposition 4. There is a generic bidding game with PSPEs that lead to different outcomes
under the same budget.
Proof. Consider the game Gtwo in Fig. 2, with some high budget resolution.
We first describe a single equilibrium γ|x in the subtree of node x. Any player with
budget more than 0.5 (or ≥ 0.5 for white) after bidding at x clearly goes to y and gets 9,
while the other player gets 1. The player i with the higher budget at x bids the difference
bi = Bi(x) − 0.5 if i = 1 and bi = Bi(x) − 0.5− ǫ if i = 2, and selects y. The other player
−i bids min{B−i, bi} if i = 2 and min{B−i, bi + ǫ} if i = 1, and selects (5, 5). Thus if the
budget is B1(x) ∈ [0.25, 0.75−ǫ], the outcome is (5, 5); if B1(x) < 0.25 the outcome is (1, 9);
and if B1(x) ≥ 0.75 the outcome is (9, 1). Note that this is a PSPE at x: if y is selected
then the loser at x cannot raise, and if (5, 5) is selected and the loser raises the bid to win,
they will get to y with not enough budget to win again.
Next, we set the initial budget at s0 to (0.5, 0.5), and describe two distinct equilibrium
bids at s0.
In the first PSPE γ∗, the bids at s0 are b1 = b2 = 0, and both players select x. White
wins and remains with budget 0.5. According to γ|x, the game ends at terminal (5, 5)
(marked with ∗). This is clearly a PSPE.
In the second PSPE γ∗∗, the bids at s0 are b1 = b2 = 0.5, and both players select (2, 2)
(marked with ∗∗). This is an equilibrium, since white remains with budget 0 after winning
at s0, and selecting x means a utility of 1 < 2 for her. Black selects (2, 2) for the same
reason, and cannot deviate by changing his bid. Finally, if white lowers her bid the outcome
does not change.
Enforcing generic preferences. In the general case, it is possible that a player is indifferent
between two outcomes t, t′ ∈ T . In such cases, we will assume throughout the paper that the
player has a strict preference towards the outcome that is also better for the other player.5
Thus every player has a strict preference order over all distinct outcomes. Recall that t ≻i t′
5To see why this assumption is necessary, note that without it even the most simple game with a single
decision node and two terminals may result in a Pareto-dominated outcome if the player with a higher
budget is indifferent between the two terminals.
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means that player i strictly prefers t over t′. In the remainder of the paper, t ≻i t′ if either
ui(t) > ui(t
′), or ui(t) = ui(t′) and u−i(t) > u−i(t′). We highlight that this assumption
only increases the number of potential deviations from a given state, and thus cannot add
new equilibria.
3.3. The PSPE semilattice
In general, Γ(G, ǫ) may contain multiple PSPEs. However, PSPEs can be partially
ordered according to the bids of the players. We define a partial order over all valid profiles.
Intuitively, profiles with lower winning bids will be lower in this order, however since each
profile consists of many bids at different states, we need to construct the partial order
carefully. In particular, profiles with smaller gaps between bids will be lower, and the order
is first decided over nodes closer the bottom. Only if both profiles are equivalent in all nodes
at some level or deeper, we check the bids at a higher level for a difference.
Given strategy profile γ and state s ∈ S, the function γs maps any budget B1 ∈ B to
bids b1 and b2, where γs(B1) = (γ(s,B1)b1 , γ(s,B1)b2) (do not confuse with γ|s, which is
the restriction of γ on the subtree rooted in s).
Definition 8. The partial order π over Γ(G, ǫ) is defined as follows.
− For a given budget level B1, γ′(s,B1) >π γ(s,B1) if either:
1. the winning bid in γ′ is higher, i.e. max{b′1, b
′
2} > max{b1, b2};
2. the winning bids are equal, and the losing bid in γ′ is lower;
3. b′1 = b2 > b1 = b
′
2 (i.e. bids are the same), but white wins in γ
′(s,B1).
Thus for every (s,B1), π is a linear order over profiles, and in particular over PSPEs.
− For s ∈ S \T , we define γ′s >π γs if γ
′(s,B1) ≥π γ(s,B1) for all B1 ∈ B, with at least
one strict inequality. Thus for each node s, π is only a partial order over profiles (see
Fig. 3 for an example).
− For s ∈ S, we define the partial order σ(s) recursively (see Fig. 4 for an example):
– γ′ =σ(t) γ for all t ∈ T ;
– γ′ >σ(s) γ if both:
1. γ′ ≥σ(s′) γ for all s
′ ∈ g(s), and
2. either γ′ >σ(s′) γ for some s
′ ∈ g(s), or γ′s >π γs.
− Finally, γ′ >π γ if γ
′ >σ(s0) γ.
Any partial order on Γ(G, ǫ) is in particular a partial order on Γ∗(G, ǫ). Note that π
ignores the part of the strategy profile that specifies the selection of the next state. We
remark that once bids are set, due to the genericity assumption there is only one way to
specify state selection in equilibrium. Thus this would not pose a problem when comparing
two PSPEs from Γ∗(G, ǫ).
Theorem 5. (Γ∗(G, ǫ), π) is a meet-semilattice.
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B1 0 ǫ 2ǫ . . . 1− ǫ 1
γ1 − (0, 4ǫ) (2ǫ, 2ǫ) . . . − −
γ2 − (ǫ, 4ǫ) (ǫ, 2ǫ) . . . − −
γ3 − (0, 5ǫ) (0, 5ǫ) . . . − −
γ4 − (0, 4ǫ) (2ǫ, 6ǫ) . . . − −
Figure 3: The table shows the bids under four different profiles at state s, for various budget levels.
Suppose that the bids for all B1 /∈ {ǫ, 2ǫ} are the same under all profiles.
From the table we can infer the following linear orders over profiles at given budget levels:
γ2(s, ǫ) <pi γ1(s, ǫ) =pi γ4(s, ǫ) <pi γ3(s, ǫ); and γ1(s, 2ǫ) <pi γ2(s, 2ǫ) <pi γ3(s, 2ǫ) <pi γ4(s, 2ǫ).
Next, we can infer a partial order over profiles at state s: γ1s , γ
2
s <pi γ
3
s , γ
4
s . However the relation e.g.
between γ1s and γ
2
s is not defined.
x
x1
xy
y
s0
bids at (x, 8):
b1 = 3
b2 = 2
bids at (y, 12):
b1 = 8
b2 = 6
(a) γ
x
x1 y
xy
s0
bids at (x, 8):
b1 = 5
b2 = 2
bids at (y, 12):
b1 = 8
b2 = 4
(b) γ′
x
x1 y
xy
s0
bids at (x, 8):
b1 = 3
b2 = 2
bids at (y, 12):
b1 = 9
b2 = 8
(c) γ′′
Figure 4: The figure shows a part of three different profiles of the same game. The bids in nodes x
and y under particular budgets are shown for each profile. For either x, y we assume that the bids are
the same across all profiles for any other budget. We also assume that in all nodes that are not shown
the bids are the same across all three profiles under any budget. For the other nodes {x1, xy, s0} we
do not assume anything about the bids, and they may differ between profiles.
In each of s ∈ {x, y} we get a different order π over the three profiles:
γ′x >pi γx =pi γ
′′
x and γ
′′
y >pi γ
′
y >pi γy .
The shading shows the order σ(s), where for any s, darker color means the respective equilibrium is
higher in the order (unless comparing two nodes with double lines). For example: γ′ >σ(x1) γ =σ(x1)
γ′′. To see why, note that by our construction γ′ ≥σ(s) γ in all s ∈ g(x1), and the relation is strict
for at least one child (x). Thus we can ignore the bids in x1 and still determine the relation σ(x1).
Another example is γ′′ >σ(xy) γ.
Observe however that γ′, γ′′ cannot be compared according to σ(xy) and σ(s0) (nodes with double
line). For xy this is because there are conflicting relations in the children of xy, and for s0 this is since
the relation in at least one child (xy) is undefined. We thus get that γ′ >pi γ and γ′′ >pi γ, whereas
γ′, γ′′ are incomparable.
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ALGORITHM 1: Compute-meet(γ, γ′)
Initialize all nodes as ‘untouched’;
for every node s in post-order do
if all of g(s) are untouched, and γs = γ
′
s // Case 1
then
set γˆs = γs;
if all of g(s) are untouched, and γs 6= γ′s // Case 2
then
for all B1 ∈ B do
set γˆ(s,B1) = minπ{γ(s,B1), γ′(s,B1)};
change s to ‘touched’;
else
// some sj ∈ g(s) are touched
Let γ = (γˆ|sj )sj∈g(s);
if γˆ|sj = γ|sj for all sj ∈ g(s) // Case 3.1
then
γˆs = γs;
else if γˆ|sj = γ
′|sj for all sj ∈ g(s) // Case 3.2
then
γˆs = γ
′
s;
else if all of γˆ|sj are PSPEs // Case 4
then
for all B1 ∈ B do
set γˆ(s,B1) to the maximal equilibrium of the first-price game
G(ǫ, s, B1,γ) according to π;
else
FAIL
change s to ‘touched’;
Proof. Given two PSPEs γ, γ′ for the same game 〈G, ǫ〉, we define their meet γˆ as the highest
PSPE γˆ such that γˆ ≤π γ and γˆ ≤π γ′. The meet γˆ = γ ∧ γ′ is unique, and is computed
by Algorithm 1. Intuitively, the algorithm traverses both PSPEs from the bottom up, and
takes the “lower” bids from each pair γ(s,B1), γ′(s,B1) according to the order π.
Let γˆ = γˆ(γ, γ′) be the output of Algorithm 1 on input γ, γ′. To prove the theorem, we
need to show that:
− the meet operation is well defined (i.e., that Algorithm 1 never fails);
− γˆ is a PSPE;
− γˆ = γ ∧ γ′;
The algorithm never fails since by induction by the time we reach node s, we already have
that all of γˆ|s′ for s′ ∈ g(s) are PSPEs.
To see why γˆ is a PSPE, we assume by induction that this holds for all nodes below s,
and go over all cases of the construction in Algorithm 1. In Cases 1 and 3, γˆ|s = γ|s (or γ′|s)
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and is thus a PSPE. In Case 2, for every B1 ∈ B both γs(B1) and γ′s(B1) are equilibrium
bids, so it does not matter which one we select (note that for all s′ ∈ g(s), γˆs′ = γs′ = γ′s′).
Since γˆs(B1) are equilibrium bids for all B1 ∈ B, γˆ|s is a PSPE. In Case 4 (when γ, γ′ are
incomparable by their children), by Prop. 2 it is possible to complete the bids for any budget
level B1 such that γˆ(s,B1) is a PSPE. As for every state (s,B1) the relation π is a linear
order over all profiles, γˆ(s,B1) is uniquely defined. In fact, it is composed of the highest
winning bid bi∗ ≤ Bi∗ and the lowest losing bid b−i∗ such that (bi∗ , b−i∗) is an equilibrium
of the first-price game G(ǫ, s, B1,γ).
To show that γˆ = γ∧γ′ we need to show that γˆ is the “largest” PSPE that is still weakly
smaller than both γ, γ′. That is, (i) γˆ ≤π γ, γ′; and (ii) for any γˆ ≤π γ, γ′, it also holds that
γˆ ≤π γˆ.
We prove (i) and (ii) together. Suppose that γˆ ≤π γ, γ′, then in particular γˆ ≤σ(s) γ, γ′
at all s ∈ S. Assume by induction that γˆ ≤σ(sj) γˆ ≤σ(sj) γ, γ
′ for all sj ∈ g(s) (this
vacuously holds at the leafs).
Thus, condition 1 in Def. 8 holds, and it remains to show that one of the two alternatives
for condition 2 also holds, i.e., either the inequality in some children is strict, or there is
(weak) inequality in s as well.
Specifically, if some of the inequalities γˆ ≤σ(sj) γ are strict (the first alternative), then
γˆ <σ(s) γ (and same for γ′) and we are done with (i). Similarly, if some of the inequalities
γˆ ≤σ(sj) γˆ are strict, then γˆ <σ(s) γˆ and we are done with (ii).
To complete (i), note that if γˆs is constructed in Cases 1 or 2, then γˆs ≤π γs, γ′s and the
second alternative of condition 2 holds. If Case 3.1 holds then γˆ|sj , γ
′|sj must differ at some
sj ∈ g(s), which means the first alternative holds for γ′ and the second alternative (with
equality) holds for γ (in Case 3.2 we get the opposite). If Case 4 holds, then γˆ differs from
both γ, γ′ in at least one child sj (may be in different children). In either case we get that
γˆ ≤σ(s) γ, γ
′. When applied to the root s0 we get γˆ ≤π γ, γ′.
To complete (ii), note that when there are no strict inequalities in the children of s, both
of γˆs and γˆs are equilibrium bids in the same first-price game G(ǫ, s, B1,γ). We show that
γˆs ≤π γˆs in each of the four cases by which γˆs was constructed. In Cases 1 and 3 this is holds
since γˆs equals one of γs, γ′s, and γˆs ≤π γs, γ
′
s. In Cases 2 and 4, by construction for all B1,
and since π is a linear order over all bidding profiles in (s,B1), we have γˆ(s,B1) ≤π γˆ(s,B1),
and thus γˆs ≤π γˆs as well. This means that the second alternative for condition 2 holds
(with weak inequality), and thus γˆ ≤σ(s) γˆ. In particular γˆ ≤π γˆ as required.
We demonstrate the computation of the meet through an example. Suppose that we
compute the meet of γ3, γ4 from Figure 3 at node s. Assuming that all nodes below s are
untouched, we are in Case 2. Then at each budget level we take the pair of bids that is
lower, getting γˆ(s, ǫ) = γ4(s, ǫ) = (0, 4ǫ), γˆ(s, 2ǫ) = γ3(s, 2ǫ) = (0, 5ǫ).
Next, suppose that the three profiles in Fig. 4 are PSPEs, and consider the meet γˆ =
γ′ ∧ γ′′. We have that γˆ|x = γ′′|x due to Case 2. Similarly, γˆ|y = γ′|y. We then complete
γˆ in the other nodes x1, xy, s0 as specified. Note that as γ′, γ′′ >π γ, their meet γˆ ≥π γ as
well (in this example it holds with a strict relation).
Since Γ(G, ǫ) is finite, Γ∗(G, ǫ) is also finite and thus by Theorem 5, π has a unique
minimum, which we refer to as the Bottom Equilibrium. We denote the Bottom Equilibrium
of the bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉 by BE(G, ǫ).
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4. Efficiency, Monotonicity, and Binary Trees
Having established the existence of PSPEs, and in particular the Bottom Equilibrium,
we next turn to study the properties of this outcome, how it depends on the budget, and
whether it is desired from the perspective of the players. This is the primary section of this
work, where we lay out our main positive result.
Definition 9. A profile γ ∈ Γ(G, ǫ) is monotone, if µγ(B′1) 1 µγ(B1) whenever B
′
1 > B1,
and likewise for player 2.
Let TP (G) ⊆ T (G) be the set of Pareto-efficient outcomes in G. That is, t ∈ TP (G) if
there is no t′ ∈ T (G) s.t. t′ ≻1 t, t′ ≻2 t.6
Definition 10. A profile γ ∈ Γ(G, ǫ) is Pareto-optimal, if µγ(B1) ∈ TP (G) for all B1 ∈ B.
Definition 11. A profile γ ∈ Γ(G, ǫ) is Pareto-surjective, if for all t ∈ TP (G), there is
some budget B1 ∈ B, s.t. µγ(B1) = t.
Intuitively, our main result is that binary bidding games always have a highly desirable
PSPE (the Bottom Equilibrium), which has all the above properties. We will first show that
if the game is not binary, none of these properties is guaranteed. Violating Pareto-surjective
is trivial: just consider a root with three children, whose utilities are (1, 3), (2, 2),and (3, 1).
There is no equilibrium where (2, 2) is selected.
Proposition 6. There is a (non-binary) bidding game, where every PSPE violates mono-
tonicity and Pareto-optimality.
Proof.
s0 x
y
(1, 8)
(2, 1)
(0, 9)
(0, 9)
(10, 7) ∗
Figure 5: The game Gbad.
Consider Gbad (Fig. 5) with some high resolution, and initial budget B2 = 0. Clearly
white can play at will, and thus the only PSPE leads to the outcome (10, 7) (marked).
Denote by B1(x) the budget at node x. Note that if players reach x, then the outcome
will be (10, 7) if B1(x) ≥ 0.75 and otherwise (0, 9). Now suppose that initial budgets are
B1 = 0.8, B2 = 0.2. If black takes the first round, he will choose (1, 8), since by choosing x
we will have B1(x) ≥ B1 = 0.8 > 0.75. In order to get to (10, 7), white has to get to x with
at least 0.75, that is to bid b1 ≤ 0.05. However if b1 < 0.2 = B2, then black will overbid
and take the turn. Thus in every PSPE white must bid at least b1 = 0.2 in s0, and play
(2, 1). This contradicts both monotonicity and Pareto: the utility of black dropped from 7
to 1 when his budget increased from 0 to 0.2, and (2, 1) is Pareto-dominated by (10, 7).
6Recall that by our assumption ≻1 and ≻2 are strict orders.
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Budget resolution. Without sufficient budget (high resolution), the bidding process may not
be powerful enough to get the efficient outcome (see Section 4.3). However we argue that
with high resolution, we can think of the budget interval as continuous, and this will be
useful (in fact crucial) in our proofs later on. This idea can be demonstrated by looking at
small game trees.
Consider a game tree with a single decision node s (height 1). It is clear that regardless
of the budget resolution ǫ, it only matters whether B1 ≥ 0.5, since this will determine who
can win the turn. Similarly, if we consider a game of height 2, then there are four relevant
“budget intervals,” namely [0, 0.25), [0.25, 0.5), [0.5, 0.75) and [0.75, 1]: in the first one the
black player can win both turns, in the second black can choose at least one victory, and so
on. We next provide a general definition of this property.
Recall that by our high resolution assumption, ǫ = 1
R·2k
for some R ≥ 4. For each
j < 2k, we define Bj1(k) =
j
2k
and
Bj(k) = {B1 ∈ Bǫ : B
j
1 ≤ B1 < B
j+1
1 } = {
j
2k
+ rǫ : r = 0, 1, . . . , R− 1}.
That is, Bj is the j’th budget subinterval, which is “closed” from below (includes j
2k
) and
“open” from above.7 We omit the parameter k when clear from the context.
Definition 12. A profile γ ∈ Γ(G, ǫ) is an interval profile if for all s ∈ S \ T , all j < 2k
and all Bˆ1 ∈ Bj, µγ(s, Bˆ1) = µγ(s,B
j
1).
When an equilibrium is not monotone, the equilibrium bids at both ends of the interval
Bj(k) may reach different intervals at the k − 1 level. Thus as we increase the resolution
ǫ, the structure of equilibria may become more and more fragmented. For both practical
and technical reasons we would prefer equilibria that are interval profiles. Unfortunately,
in the general case the Bottom Equilibrium may not be an interval profile due to lack of
monotonicity. However for binary trees, we will see that the Bottom Equilibrium is both
monotone and an interval profile.
4.1. Binary bidding games
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof of our main theorem:
Theorem 7. Let G be a binary bidding game with high resolution ǫ, and let γ = BE(G, ǫ).
Then:
(A) At any point γ(s,B1), either b1 = b2 (if white wins) or b2 = b1 + ǫ (if black wins);
(B) γ is an interval profile;
(C) γ is Pareto-surjective;
(D) γ is Pareto-optimal;
(E) γ is monotone.
7The budget B1 = 1 is included in the last interval B2
k
−1.
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ALGORITHM 2: Find-PSPE(G,R)
Set ǫ← 1
R
2−height(G) ; // Global variable
B ← {c · ǫ : c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌈1/ǫ⌉}};
Initialize tables A1, A2, T ∗, I of size |S| × |B|;
In every leaf t, assign T ∗(t, B1) = t for all B1 ∈ B;
for every node s ∈ S \ T in post-order do
for every budget partition B1 ∈ B: do
b1 ← 0; b2 ← 0 ; // Initialize both bids
i∗ ← 1 ; // Initially player 1 wins
s1 ← argmaxs′∈g(s) u1(T
∗(s′, B1));
s2 ← argmaxs′∈g(s) u2(T
∗(s′, B1));
t∗ ← T ∗(s1, B1);
if s1 = s2 then
// No conflict. White wins with bid 0 and plays s1
Break;
repeat
// Try deviation by loser −i∗:
b′−i∗ ← b−i∗ + ǫ;
t′ ← T ∗(s−i∗ , B−i∗ − b′−i∗);
if b′−i∗ > B−i∗ or t
′ −i∗ t∗ then
Break; // Deviation impossible or not successful
else
i∗ ← −i∗; // Loser becomes winner
bi∗ ← b′i∗ ; // Deviation becomes the new bid
t∗ ← t′;
// Write down the equilibrium strategies in γ(s,B1):
I(s,B1)← i
∗; // winner
Ai(s,B1)← (bi, si) for i ∈ {1, 2}; // actions of players
(bid+selection)
T ∗(s,B1)← t∗; // terminal
until;
return γ ← (I, A1, A2, T ∗);
Recall that we denote by γ|s the projection of γ on a subgame of G that is rooted in
s. Similarly, µ|s = µγ|s . We will sometimes use the budget of player 2 as the input for µ,
rather than the budget of player 1. This should be clear from the notation. That is, µ(B1)
and µ(B2) always refer to the same outcome in T (G).
Denote the two children of s0 by sl, sr. As the proof of all parts is by induction on the
height of G, we assume that γ = BE(G, ǫ) has been computed on both subtrees Gl = G|sl
and Gr = G|sr , and denote γ
(l) = γ|sl , γ
(r) = γ|sr and similarly for µl, µr. By construction,
we have that γ(l) = BE(Gl, ǫ), γ(r) = BE(Gr , ǫ). Thus by the induction hypothesis both of
γ(l), γ(r) have all properties (A)-(E).
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Proof of Theorem 7(A) (near-tie). By induction in each subtree we have that γ(l), γ(r) are
monotone. Suppose (b1, b2) are the Bottom Equilibrium bids at some state γs(B1), and
assume towards a contradiction that b1 > b2. Consider the bid profile γ′s(B1) = (b1, b2 + ǫ).
Either (b1, b2 + ǫ) are equilibrium bids, or there is a deviation. However the only deviation
that is not also available in (b1, b2) is by the white player. W.l.o.g. white can deviate by
bidding b′1 = (b2 + ǫ) − ǫ = b2, since as long as she drops below b2 + ǫ the outcome is the
same (this is a first-price game). Now either (b′1, b2 + ǫ) are equilibrium bids, or black has a
deviation. By monotonicity of γ(l) and γ(r), black cannot gain by bidding b′2 > b2 + ǫ, since
µl(B2 − b′2) 2 µl(B2 − (b2 + ǫ)) and likewise for µr. Thus the only deviation is to decrease
his bid and drop the round, w.l.o.g. to b′2 = b
′
1. Again either (b
′
1, b
′
2) is an equilibrium,
or white drops to b′′1 = b
′
2 − ǫ and so on until no player has a deviation at some (b
∗
1, b
∗
2).
Thus we get a PSPE γ∗ where γ∗s (B1) = (b
∗
1, b
∗
2). If there were at least two deviations, then
b∗i∗ < b1. If there are no deviations, then b
∗
i∗ = b1 and b
∗
−i∗ > b2. If there is exactly one
deviation then b∗i∗ = b
∗
2 = b1 and b
∗
1 = b2. In either case, we get that (b
∗
1, b
∗
2) <π (b1, b2),
and thus γ∗ <π γ, which is a contradiction to γ being the Bottom Equilibrium. The proof
for b2 > b1 + ǫ is the same except that there are only two cases for (b∗1, b
∗
2) (no deviations,
or at least one).
Lemma 8. Algorithm 2 computes γ.
Proof. Recall that k = height(G). Note that the algorithm effectively goes over all states
s ∈ S \ T from the bottom up, and for for any possible budget allocation, runs an auction
where players iteratively modify their bids by the smallest possible increment ǫ, until none
of them can gain by further modifying her bid. Note that the players never change their
selected state when increasing their bid. Indeed, if player 2 has an incentive to raise at
the initial bids of (0, 0) (and select child s2) only if he strictly prefers t′ = µ2(B2 − ǫ) over
t∗ = µ1(B2), and µ1(B2) 2 µ1(B2− ǫ) by monotonicity of γ(2). Similarly, now player 1 has
an incentive to raise only if she prefers t′ = µ1(B1 − ǫ) over t∗ = µ2(B2 − ǫ), which means
that t′ ≻1 µ2(B2 − ǫ) = µ2(B1 + ǫ) 1 µ2(B1 − ǫ) by monotonicity of γ(1). This continues
with every raise of bid, so player 1 always prefers s1 and player 2 always prefers s2.
By property (A), the winning and losing bids in γ are nearly tied or tied. The algorithm
goes over all such pairs of bids in increasing order and thus must reach (b1, b2) as in γ(s,B1)
unless it stops at some lower bids. Suppose there are lower bids γ′s(B1) = (b
′
1, b
′
2) where the
loser −i∗ cannot deviate by ǫ and the algorithm stops. Then by monotonicity of γ(1), γ(2),
neither i∗ nor −i∗ can deviate by further increasing their bid. Further, by Lemma 3, bids
can only increase so there is no deviation by decreasing a bid either, meaning that γ′ is also
a PSPE which is lower than γ. A contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 7(B) (Intervals). Let s be a node at height k and j < 2k. Consider
γs(B
j
1) = (b1, b2) and Bˆ1 ∈ B
j(k). Note that the size of each level k interval is R, and the
size of level k − 1 intervals is 2R. Thus Bˆ1 = B
j
1 + rǫ for some r < R. Suppose first that
b1 ≥ b2, i.e. that white wins. By property (A), b1 = b2. Let j′, j′′ < 2k−1 be the level
k − 1 budget intervals reached when white wins and if white drops, respectively. Formally,
Bj1 − b1 ∈ B
j′(k − 1) and Bj1 + b1 = B
j
1 + b2 ∈ B
j′′(k − 1). We argue that there are 3 cases:
Case 0 b1 = b2 = 0 (no conflict). Both agents prefer the same node s′ ∈ g(s) at the
current budget B1. So all of interval Bj
′
(k − 1) is (weakly) preferred to all of interval
Bj
′′
(k − 1).
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Figure 6: The middle row shows intervals j′ and j′′ of level k − 1 (each of size 2R · ǫ). The top row
shows an interval j of level k (of size R · ǫ) and the equilibrium bids in Case 1L at (s, Bj1). The bottom
row shows the equilibrium bids at Bˆ1 = B
j
1 + rǫ. Note that b1 = b2 and bˆ1 = bˆ2.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium bids at (s, Bj1) and (s, Bˆ1) in Case 1W.
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For any Bˆ1 ∈ Bj(k) with bˆ1 = bˆ2 = 0 this still holds, as Bj(k) is contained in both
Bj
′
(k−1) and Bj
′′
(k−1) (which are actually the same interval but in different nodes).
Thus γ(s, Bˆ1) = (0, 0) as well.
Case 1L Bj1 + b1 is the maximal point in B
j′′(k − 1), i.e. Bj1 + b1 = B
j′′+1
1 − ǫ = B
j′′
1 +
(2R − 1)ǫ. This means that B1 − b1 = B
j′
1 + ǫ. By the progress of Algorithm 2 we
can conclude due to Lemma 8 that white prefers outcome j′ (and winning the turn)
over outcome j′′ (and losing the turn), otherwise she would not have made the last
increase from to b1. Similarly, black prefers j′′ over j′, but prefers j′ over j′′ + 1, as
otherwise he would deviate to b2 + ǫ.
Let Bˆ1 = B
j
1 + rǫ (where r < R). Denote bˆ1 = b1 − rǫ, bˆ2 = bˆ1 = b2 − rǫ. Equilibrium
bids are presented graphically in Fig. 6. We argue that
− Bˆ1 + bˆ2 ∈ Bj
′′
(k − 1);
− Bˆ1 − bˆ1 ∈ Bj
′
(k − 1); and
− γs(Bˆ1) = (bˆ1, bˆ2)
The first claim is obvious, since Bˆ1+ bˆ2 = B
j
1+b2 ∈ B
j′′(k−1). To see why the second
claim holds, note that since r < R,
Bˆ1 − bˆ1 = B
j
1 + rǫ − (b1 − rǫ) = B
j
1 − b1 + 2rǫ < B
j
1 − b1 + (2R− 1)ǫ,
which is still in interval Bj
′
(k − 1).
For the third claim, suppose the equilibrium bids are lower than bˆ1. If white wins
then the outcome is either in interval j′, or in a higher interval which is even worse for
black. This means black would have a deviation to bˆ2. Similarly, if black wins with
b′2 ≤ bˆ2 then the outcome is wither in interval j
′′ or in a lower interval which is worse
for white, and thus white would have a deviation to bˆ1. By Lemma 8, it is left to show
that Algorithm 2 stops at (bˆ1, bˆ2). Indeed, the next deviation by black would reach
interval j′′ + 1, and we know black prefers the current outcome j′. Intuitively what
we showed is that Bj1 + b2 = B
j′′
1 + (2R− 1)ǫ is the “critical point” where the auction
stops, as long as B1 ∈ Bj(k) (see rightmost dotted line in Fig. 6).
Case 1W Bj1 + b1 is not the maximal point in its interval B
j′′(k− 1). Then we argue that
Bj1 − b1 is the highest point of B
j′(k − 1), i.e. Bj1(k) − b1 = B
j′
1 (k − 1) + (2R − 1)ǫ.
This is since both agents prefer interval j′ (where white wins) over j′′ (where black
wins), as otherwise black would raise by ǫ. Then since b1 = b2, we get that B
j
1 + b2 =
Bj
′′
1 (k− 1)+ ǫ, i.e. that the losing bid reaches the second-lowest point on its interval.
Now, we continue in a similar way to Case 1L, except that here critical point is
Bj1− b1 = B
j′
1 (k− 1)+ (2R− 1)ǫ, i.e. determined by the winner i = 1 (leftmost dotted
line in Fig. 7). Thus define bˆ1 = bˆ2 = b1 + rǫ, and we will show that
− Bˆ1 − bˆ1 ∈ Bj
′
(k − 1);
− Bˆ1 + bˆ2 ∈ Bj
′′
(k − 1); and
− γs(Bˆ1) = (bˆ1, bˆ2)
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Figure 8: Equilibrium bids at (s, Bj1) in Case 2L and 2W. Note that in both cases b2 = b1 + ǫ. The
critical point in each case is marked with a double dotted line.
The first claim follows since Bˆ1 − bˆ1 = B
j
1 − b1 ∈ B
j′(k − 1), and the second since
Bˆ1+bˆ2 = B
j
1(k)+rǫ+(b1+rǫ) = B
j
1(k)+b1+2rǫ = B
j′′
1 (k−1)+ǫ+2rǫ ≤ B
j′′
1 (k−1)+(2R−1)ǫ.
As in Case 1L, the algorithm would not stop at lower bids than bˆ1. Any increase by
black would reach interval j′′ or higher (worse for black), but we know black prefers
j′ over j′′ so would not deviate.
In either case, we get by the induction hypothesis that
µγ(s, Bˆ1) = µγ(si, Bˆ1 − bˆ1) = µγ(si, B
j
1 − b1) = µγ(s,B
j
1).
If b2 > b1, then Case 0 is impossible, and we get two cases similar to the above analysis
(see Fig. 8): Case 2L where the critical point is Bj1−b1 = B
j′
1 (k−1) andB
j
1+b2 = B
j′′
1 (k−1)+
ǫ; and case 2W where the critical point is Bj1+b2 = B
j′′
1 (k−1), and B
j
1−b1 = B
j′
1 (k−1)+ǫ.
In either case we get that there is some critical player iˆ, for which Bˆiˆ − bˆiˆ = B
j
iˆ
− biˆ, and
that Bˆ−iˆ − bˆ−iˆ, B
j
−iˆ
− b−iˆ reach the same level k − 1 budget interval (details omitted but
very similar to cases 1L,1W). Then again, by the induction hypothesis
µγ(s, Bˆ1) = µγ(si, Bˆ2 − bˆ2) = µγ(si, B
j
2 − b2) = µγ(s,B
j
1).
Note that in particular we proved the following corollary (phrased as a lemma since will
be used later):
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Lemma 9. For any s ∈ S \ T and j < 2k, one of the following five cases applies for the
Bottom Equilibrium γs(B
j
1) = (b1, b2).
Case Winner Critical Bid of player 1 Bid of player 2
0 i∗ = 1 - 0 0
1L i∗ = 1 iˆ = 2 Bj1(k)− b1 = B
j′
1 (k−1) + ǫ B
j
1(k) + b2 = B
j′′
1 + (2R−1)ǫ
1W i∗ = 1 iˆ = 1 Bj1(k)− b1 = B
j′
1 (k−1) + (2R−1)ǫ B
j
1(k) + b2 = B
j′′
1 + ǫ
2L i∗ = 2 iˆ = 1 Bj1(k)− b1 = B
j′
1 (k−1) B
j
1(k) + b2 = B
j′′
1 (k−1) + ǫ
2W i∗ = 2 iˆ = 2 Bj1(k)− b1 = B
j′
1 (k−1) + ǫ B
j
1(k) + b2 = B
j′′
1 (k−1)
Proof of Theorem 7(C) (Pareto-surjective). We prove by induction on the height of the tree
G. For height 0 it is obvious. For height 1 either one leaf weakly Pareto-dominates the other,
in which case this leaf is reached in µ regardless of budgets, or each player has a favorite
leaf in which case both leafs are Pareto-efficient.
Let t∗ ∈ TP (G), we need to show that there is some initial budget B ∈ B s.t. that
µ(B) = t∗. W.l.o.g. t∗ ∈ TP (Gl).
By induction on property (C), let B∗1 s.t. µl(B
∗
1 ) = t
∗ (must exist), and let t∗r = µr(B
∗
1 ).
As γ is an interval profile, w.l.o.g. B∗1 = B
j
1(k)+2ǫ for some j < 2
k (i.e. it an even multiple
of ǫ, and is not on the edge of its respective interval). This is possible by property (B) and
since R ≥ 4. Thus by slightly increasing or decreasing the budget, the outcome will not
change: µl(B∗1 − 2ǫ) = µl(B
∗
1 + ǫ) = t
∗ [also equal to µl(B∗2 − ǫ)]; and likewise for µr.
We know that t∗r does not strictly Pareto dominate t
∗ (as t∗ ∈ TP (G)), thus either
t∗r ≺1 t
∗ or t∗r ≺2 t
∗.
Case I: Both players prefer t∗ over t∗r at budget B
∗
1 . We claim that the equilibrium bids
are b1 = b2 = 0.
Suppose that black raises to b′ > b2 = 0, takes the round and goes right. then
µr(B
∗
2 − b
′) 2 µr(B
∗
2 ) = t
∗
r ≺2 t
∗,
and thus black does not gain. Therefore b1 = b2 = 0, and µ(B∗1) = µl(B
∗
1) = t
∗.
Case II: Suppose that t∗r ≻2 t
∗, t∗r ≺1 t
∗, i.e. that black strictly prefers child sr at
budget B∗2 , whereas white strictly prefers sl. Let Bˆ2 ≤ B
∗
2 be the lowest budget s.t. for
every β2 ∈ [Bˆ2, B∗2 ], µr(β2) ≻2 t
∗ (it is possible that Bˆ2 = 0). Set tˆr = µr(Bˆ2). By Pareto-
optimality of t∗ it follows that for every β2 ∈ [Bˆ2, B∗2 ], white prefers sl (since µr(β1) ≺1
t∗ = µl(B
∗
1 ) 1 µl(β1)).
We set B2 =
B∗
2
+Bˆ2
2 , B1 = 1 − B2, and argue that µ(B1) = t
∗. Let b∗ = B
∗
2
−Bˆ2
2 . We
will show that the equilibrium in s0 is b1 = b2 = b∗. Note that Bˆ2 is the lower bound of a
budget interval and thus also an even multiple of ǫ, so B2 and b∗ are integer multiples of ǫ .
As long as bids are strictly below b∗, the resulting budget is in the “conflict zone” [Bˆ2, B∗2 ],
and the lowest bidder will raise to take the turn from the other bidder. Suppose now that
b1 = b2 = b
∗. If Bˆ2 = 0, then b2 = b∗ = B2 and black cannot raise. Otherwise, by definition
of b∗ if black raises his bid to b′2 = b
∗ + ǫ, then
t∗ 2 µr(Bˆ2 − ǫ) = µr(B2 − (b
∗ + ǫ)) = µr(B2 − b
′
2),
so black cannot gain by selecting sr. Thus b1 = b2 = b∗ is an equilibrium, where µ(B1) =
µl(B
∗
1).
Case III: t∗r ≻1 t
∗, i.e. white strictly prefers sr at budget B∗1 . Quite expectantly, the
proof of case III is similar to case II, where white and black change roles. However, there
are some fine issues due to tie-breaking, so we lay out the full proof.
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Let Bˆ1 ≤ B∗1 be the lowest budget s.t. for every β1 ∈ [Bˆ1, B
∗
1 ], µr(β1) ≻1 t
∗. Set
tˆr = µr(Bˆ1). As in case II, whenever the budget after the bid is in the range [Bˆ1, B∗1 ], white
prefers sr whereas black prefers sl. We define B1 =
Bˆ1+B
∗
1
2 , b
∗ =
B∗
1
−Bˆ1
2 , and argue that
the equilibrium reached in s0 is b1 = b∗, b2 = b∗ + ǫ.
Indeed, if b1 < b2 ≤ b∗, then black selects sl under the remaining budget B2 − b2 ≥ B∗2 ,
and we have µr(B1− b2) ≻1 t∗ = µl(B∗1) = µl(B2− b
∗) 1 µl(B2− b2). I.e., white will raise
her bid to b′1 = b2.
Similarly, if b1 = b2 ≤ b∗, then white selects sr, but black wants to raise to b′2 = b2 + ǫ:
since B2 − b′2 ≥ B2 − b
∗ − ǫ = B∗2 − ǫ, we have
8
µl(B2 − b
′
2) 2 µl(B
∗
2 − ǫ) = µl(B
∗
2) = t
∗ ≻2 tˆr = µr(B2 + b
∗) 2 µr(B2 + b1).
It remains to show that b2 = b1 + ǫ = b∗ + ǫ is an equilibrium, i.e. that white will not
raise. This is exactly as in case II. Either white cannot raise, or b′1 > b
∗. In the latter case,
µr(B1− b
′
1) 1 µr(B1− b
∗− ǫ) = µr(Bˆ1− ǫ) 1 t
∗, where the last inequality is by definition
of Bˆ1. Thus white cannot gain by selecting sr, and clearly not by keeping sl at a lower
budget.
Proof of Theorem 7(D) (Pareto-optimal). Let b1, b2 be equilibrium bids in s0 reached by
the above process. We use throughout the proof the fact that by monotonicity of both
subgames, it only makes sense for a player to raise her bid if she selects the branch that is
not currently played. Note that we may not use the fact that µ itself is monotone, since
this will be the last thing we prove.
Assume w.l.o.g. that b1 = b2 (white takes) and that under budget B1− b1, white prefers
sl. We argue that t∗l = µl(B1− b1) is Pareto-efficient in G. Assume, toward a contradiction,
that there is some t∗r ∈ TP (Gr) that Pareto dominates t
∗
l (i.e., t
∗
r ≻1,2 t
∗
l ). Since γ
(r) has
property (C) by induction, t∗r = µr(B
′
1) for some budget B
′
1.
Case 1: Suppose first that B′1 > B1, i.e. that white must drop the turn in order to reach
sr with sufficient budget. Denote b′ = B′1 − B1 (note that b
′ = B2 − B′2 ≤ B2). We argue
that b′ > b1. If b1 = 0, then clearly b′ > 0 = b1, thus suppose b1 > 0. Then by construction
of the equilibrium (b1, b2), t∗l is strictly preferred by white over the outcome of (b1 − ǫ, b2),
which is µr(B1 + b1) (as b2 = b1). Thus,
µr(B1 + b
′) = t∗r ≻1 t
∗
l ≻1 µr(B1 + b1).
By monotonicity, we must have b′ > b1 = b2. Next, recall that t∗r ≻2 t
∗
l . Thus black could
raise his bid to b′ > b1 = b2 and strictly gain. This shows that (b1, b2) are not an equilibrium
in s0, in contradiction to the construction of γ.
Case 2: B′1 = B1 − b
′ for some b′ ≥ 0. If b1 = 0, then µr(B1) 1 µr(B′1) = t
∗
r ≻1 t
∗
l =
µl(B1). That is, white prefers sr but chose sl. A contradiction.
Thus suppose b1 > 0, and we will show that this will lead to a contradiction.
Since µr(B1 − b′) = t∗r ≻1 t
∗
l 1 µr(B1 − b1), we must have by monotonicity of µr
that 0 ≤ b′ ≤ b1. By the construction of the equilibrium bids, white strictly preferred
t∗l = µl(B1 − b1) over the previous state µr(B1 + b2) = µr(B1 + b1) (where the bid of
8The equality is by our selection of B∗2 so that it is not on the edge of its respective interval. This is the
only place where our assumption of high resolution is applied. However this seemingly innocuous assumption
is critical, as we show in the next section.
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player 1 was strictly lower). Thus t∗r 1 t
∗
l ≻1 µr(B1 + b1) 1 µr(B1 − b
′) = t∗r , which is a
contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 7(E) (Monotonicity). By the induction hypothesis, both of µl, µr are
monotone. Let B′1 = B1 + ǫ, and let b1, b2 be the equilibrium bids in γ(s0, B1). Like-
wise, b′1, b
′
2 are the equilibrium bids in γ(s0, B
′
1), where B
′
1 = B1 + ǫ.
Case 1: Suppose white takes under γ(s0, B1), thus b1 = b2 by property (A). By our
assumption, player 1 selects sl at γ(s0, B1), and the outcome is tl = µl(B1− b1) 1 µr(B1+
b2) (in fact the inequality is strict if b1 > 0, or else player 1 would never bid b1).
We argue that b′2 ≤ b1+ǫ. Otherwise, it means that Algorithm 2 reached bids (b1+ǫ, b1+
ǫ) under budget B′1 and then black raised again. However, at bid b1 + ǫ white remains with
B′1−(b1+ǫ) = B1−b1 and thus we know the outcome is t
′
l = µl(B1−b1) 2 µr(B2−(b1+ǫ))
(since black does not raise to b1 + ǫ under B1). By raising under B′1, the outcome for black
will be
µr(B
′
2 − (b1 + 2ǫ)) = µr(B2 − b1 − 3ǫ) 2 µr(B2 − (b1 + ǫ)) 2 t
′
l,
that is, black does not gain.
We conclude that b′1, b
′
2 ≤ b1+ǫ. Then, by bidding b
′′
1 = b1+ǫ at budget B
′
1 and selecting
sl, white can guarantee a value of µl(B′1− b
′′
1) = µl((B1 + ǫ)− (b1+ ǫ)) = µl(B1− b1). Thus
its current value µ(B′1) is at least the same, and we get µ(B
′
1) 1 µl(B1 − b1) = µ(B1).
Case 2: Next, we prove for the case where black takes under γ(s0, B1) (i.e., b2 = b1 + ǫ).
Note that in particular b2 ≥ ǫ. W.l.o.g. black selects sr, and the outcome is tr = µ(B2) =
µr(B2 − b2) = µr(B1 + b2).
By Lemma 8 and the way Algorithm 2 works, player 1 selects the same child of s0 (w.l.o.g
sl) at any bid at or below the equilibrium bids. Thus, if b1 > 0 then for every bˆ1 ≤ b1,
µl(B1 − bˆ1) ≻1 µr(B1 − bˆ1). Player 2 always prefers the other child (sr), unless both bid 0
in equilibrium, thus for every bˆ2 < b2, µr(B2 − bˆ2) ≻2 µl(B2 − bˆ2).
We claim that b′2 > b2 − 2ǫ. Assume, towards a contradiction, that b
′
2 ≤ b2 − 2ǫ (in
particular b1, b2 > 0). Suppose that black wins, i.e. that b′2 = b
′
1 + ǫ and t
′ = µr(B
′
2 − b
′
2).
Note that b′2 (and reaching t
∗
r = µr(B2 − b
′
2)) is not a winning equilibrium bid under B1,
i.e., by bidding b∗1 = b
′
2 white remains with B1 − b
∗
1 and gets a strictly better outcome
µl(B1 − b′2) ≻1 t
∗
r . Therefore (the second inequality is by monotonicity of µr),
µl(B
′
1 − (b
′
2 + ǫ)) = µl(B1 − b
′
2) ≻1 t
∗
r = µr(B2 − b
′
2) 1 µr(B
′
2 − b
′
2) = t
′,
i.e., white has a deviation from (b′1, b
′
2) in γ(s0, B
′
1).
Now suppose that white wins, i.e. that b′2 = b
′
1 and t
′ = µl(B
′
1 − b
′
1). We use the fact
that (b1, b1) is not an equilibrium in γ(s0, B1), as black raised to b2 = b1+ ǫ. Note also that
b′2 < b2 − ǫ = b1.
µr(B
′
2 − b1) = µr((B2 − ǫ)− b1) = µr(B2 − (b1 + ǫ)) = µr(B2 − b2)
≻2 µl(B2 + b1) (by the last increase of black in γ(s0, B1))
2 µl(B2 + b
′
1) 2 µl(B
′
2 + b
′
1) (by monotonocity of µl)
= µl(B
′
1 − b
′
1) = t
′.
This means that black can strictly gain at γ(s0, B′1) by raising his bid from b
′
2 to b1. In
either case (black or white win), we get a contradiction to (b′1, b
′
2) being an equilibrium,
which proves the claim.
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Thus b′2 ≥ b2 − ǫ. We next lower-bound the utility of the new outcome t
′ = µ(B′1) to
player 1: t′ 1 µr(B′1 + b
′
2), since if black wins in γ(s0, B
′
1) then the right-hand side is t
′,
and if white wins then the outcome is strictly better for her, or otherwise she would not
raise. Then,
t′ 1 µr(B
′
1 + b
′
2) = µr(B1 + b
′
2 + ǫ) 1 µr(B1 + b2) = tr,
where the second inequality is by monotonicity of µr.
Finally, the above proof only shows monotonicity for the white player. Monotonicity
for the black player now follows immediately from property (D). Since µ(B2) = µ(B1) is
(weakly) better for white than µ(B2 + ǫ) = µ(B1− ǫ), it cannot be strictly better for black.
Otherwise µ(B2 + ǫ) would be Pareto dominated by µ(B2). Thus µ(B2 + ǫ) 2 µ(B2).
4.2. Why Bottom Equilibrium?
While there may be multiple equilibria, we argue that the Bottom Equilibrium, when
exists, is the most natural one. One justification is that players may want to maintain as
much budget as they can in each round, given that their utility in the rest of the game is
monotone in the remaining budget. In other words, if we focus on the single bidding round,
each player is inclined to bid the minimal amount.
A second informal justification is that in the Bottom Equilibrium each player is nearly
indifferent between winning and losing the round: small deviations (i.e. higher or lower bid)
of the other player −i cannot substantially hurt i. Further, the loser of the round in the
Bottom Equilibrium never regrets if the other player bids too low and becomes the loser.
On the other hand in other PSPEs the loser has a “risk” of becoming a winner with very
low budget. Thus it is safer in some sense to play the Bottom Equilibrium.
Our third justification is that we can maintain the Bottom Equilibrium as the unique
PSPE by slightly changing the rules of the auction.9 Indeed, suppose that instead of a sealed-
bid auction in every step, we hold an ascending auction (similar to an English auction),
where in each step the price rise by ǫ and the loser has a chance to accept the new price
and become a winner. Since this is essentially equivalent to the auction being simulated in
Algorithm 2, the unique outcome is the Bottom Equilibrium.
Corollary 10. Any binary bidding game 〈G, ǫ〉 with the above ascending auction rule has
a unique PSPE, which is the Bottom Equilibrium of 〈G, ǫ〉.
4.3. Low budget resolution
We showed in Section 3 that a PSPE exists regardless of the budget resolution. However
for our main theorem we also assumed “high resolution” that is at least exponential in the
height of the game tree. We next show that high resolution is necessary for Pareto Efficiency
(main part of Theorem 7) to hold.
Proposition 11. For any k ≥ 2 there is a binary bidding game structure Gk of height k,
s.t. for any 1 < R′ < 2k−1, the game
〈
Gk,
1
R′
〉
with B1 < 0.5 has no Pareto-optimal PSPEs.
Proof. Consider the binary game Gk, described in Figure 9. In order to reach one of the
Pareto-optimal leaves (marked with ∗), the same player must win k− 1 times in a row after
a branch is selected (as each branch is an ordinal 0-sum game). Since 2k−1B2 > 1, and the
9We thank David Parkes for this observation.
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s0
x1 x2 xk−2 xk−1
y1 y2 yk−2 yk−1
(7, 9) ∗
(9, 7) ∗
(8, 1)
(1, 8)
Figure 9: The game Gk. Pareto-optimal terminals are marked with ∗.
budget of the loser doubles with each loss, player 1 cannot win in all k − 1 times unless
B2(y1) = 0. Similarly, since after every win of player 2, the budget of player 1 will be at
least 1
R′
> 21−k, player 2 cannot win in all k − 1 times either (even if initially B2(x1) = 1).
Therefore, if after the first turn the selected child is x1, the outcome will be (8, 1); and if
the selected child is y1 then the outcome will be (1, 8) (again, unless B2(y1) = 0). The only
way to reach B2(y1) = 0 is if black bids all of his budget b2 = B2 at s0 and then selects y1.
However, this is not an equilibrium: since b1 ≤ B1 < b2 − 1R′ , black can decrease his bid to
B1 +
1
R′
and gain 8 instead of 7.
Note that due to our tie-breaking assumption it is impossible for agent 1 to similarly
surrender her budget, since agent 2 must bid at least 1
R′
to win each turn.
The example above does not cover the case of R′ = 1 (“single coin”). In that case,
Consider the game G′k (for some k ≥ 2) and a root node s
′ whose children are s0 and (1, 8).
If player 2 starts with the coin (B2 = 1) then in the only equilibrium he wins the first turn
and selects (1, 8), as he cannot get more than 7 by reaching s0.
5. Continuous Bids
We denote by 〈G,−〉 the game G with continuous bids, where the set of allowed budget
partitions is B = [0, 1] and B1 + B2 = 1. Note that the strategy space in such games is
infinite, and thus it is not a-priori clear that these games have a subgame perfect equilibrium,
let alone a PSPE. Indeed, we show that if the tie-breaking method can depend on the node,
then there are games, even zero-sum games, where no equilibrium exists.
Proposition 12. There is a zero-sum bidding game with node-specific tie breaking, that has
no subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 10a. This is a zero-sum game where the white
player is the maximizer. By the tie-breaking rule, white wins in x′ if her budget is strictly
above 0.5, and wins in y′ if her budget is at least 0.5. In state x, white needs to take at least
one turn to win the game. Thus a budget of B1(x) > 0.25 is sufficient. Similarly, in state y
white has to take twice, and thus must have a budget of b1(y) ≥ 0.75 to win the game.
Clearly, if the initial budget partition in s0 is B1 ≥ 0.5 + δ for some δ > 0, then white
can win by bidding b1 = 0.25+ δ/2: either she takes the turn and reaches x with 0.25+ δ/2,
or loses the turn and reaches to y with B1+ b2 ≥ 0.5+ δ+(0.25+ δ/2) = 0.75+3δ/2 > 0.75.
Similarly, if B1 < 0.5 + δ then black can bid 0.25 + δ/2 and force white to lose.
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s0
x
y
x′
y′
1 1
1
−1 −1
−1
(a) The value of each terminal is marked
with a square. White always prefers the up-
per state in each step, black always prefers
the lower state. The double arrows indicate
which step is played in case of a tie in the
auction.
b1
b2
(b) The value for every bidding profile
(b1, b2) ∈ [0,
1
2
]2 at state s0. White wins in
white areas, black wins in grey areas. The
dashed arrows mark the winner in case of a
bidding profile that is on the boundary be-
tween segments.
Figure 10: A game with continuous budgets, inconsistent tie-breaking, and no SPE.
Now, suppose B1 = B2 = 0.5. We first show that there is no value in pure strategies,
by showing that for any bid of one player, the other player has a bid that leads to victory.
The outcome for any pair of deterministic bids (b1, b2) is displayed in Fig. 10b.
Let b1 ∈ [0, B1]. If b1 < 0.25 then set b2 = b1. Thus black takes the turn and gets to y
with B2(y) > 0.25, which is sufficient for victory. If b1 ≥ 0.25, then black can bid b2 < b1.
Now white remains with B1(x) = 0.5 − b1 ≤ 0.25, which means black wins. Thus white
cannot guarantee any value above −1.
We next consider the black player. Let b2 ∈ [0, B2]. If b2 < 0.25 then denote b2 = 0.25−δ,
and set b1 = b2 + δ/2 < 0.25. Then white takes and gets to x with B1(x) = 0.5− b1 > 0.25,
which is sufficient for victory. If b2 ≥ 0.25, then set b1 < b2. Now black remains with
B2(y) = 0.5− b2 ≤ 0.25, which means white wins. Thus black cannot guarantee any value
below 1.
It is not hard to generalize the above argument to see that there is no value even in
mixed strategies. Indeed, let b2 ∈ ∆([0, B2]) be any mixed strategy of black. There must
be an open interval A = (0.25− δ, 0.25) s.t. b2 assigns a probability of less than 0.01 to A.
Then white can bid b1 = 0.25− δ/2 and win w.p. of at least 0.99: by our arguments on pure
strategies, the only bids of black that beat b1 are in the range [b1, 0.25) ⊆ A. Therefore the
value of the game under equal initial budgets is at least 0.99(1) + 0.01(−1) = 0.98.
Similarly, let b1 ∈ ∆([0, B1]) be some mixed strategy of white. Again there is some open
interval A′ = (0.25 − δ, 0.25) that is played by white w.p. less than 0.01. Then by playing
b2 = 0.25−δ/2 black can win w.p. of at least 0.99, and the value cannot be above −0.98.
Consider a game structure G. With continuous bids, the Bottom Equilibrium is not well-
defined, as positive equilibrium bids may be arbitrarily small. However, we next show that
playing with continuous bids is essentially the same as playing with high budget resolution.
Denote by B
j
(k) = [Bj1(k), B
j+1
1 (k)) the j’th continuous budget interval of level k.
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Theorem 13. Let γ = BE(G, ǫ) for some binary game G and high resolution ǫ. There is a
PSPE γ of 〈G,−〉 such that for all j < 2k and for all Bˆ1 ∈ B
j
(k), µ(Bˆ1) = µ(B
j
1) = µ(B
j
1)
(where µ = µγ).
In other words, there is a PSPE of 〈G,−〉 that for any budget in the interval yields
exactly the same outcome we would get in the Bottom Equilibrium of 〈G, ǫ〉 for the same
budget interval.
Proof. The proof is (as usual) by induction. Let (b1, b2) = γs(B
j
1) be the equilibrium bids
in the discrete game. We denote by j′ and j′′ the respective level k − 1 intervals of Bj1 − b1
and Bj1 + b2. By induction, µ(B1) = µ(B
j′
1 ) = µ(B
j′
1 ) for all B1 ∈ B
j′
(k − 1) and likewise
for j′′. So that in level k − 1 it only matters in which budget interval we arrive.
For each Bˆ1 ∈ B
j
(k) we need to define equilibrium bids bˆ1 ≤ Bˆ1, bˆ2 ≤ Bˆ2 so that: (a)
Bˆ1 − bˆ1 ∈ B
j′
(k − 1); (b) Bˆ2 − bˆ2 ∈ B
j′′
(k − 1); (c) bˆ1 ≥ bˆ2 ⇐⇒ b1 ≥ b2. This will
guarantee that any deviation to a different interval at γs(Bˆ1) entails a deviation in γs(B
j
1).
In addition, we have to make sure that (d) no agent has a new deviation to a different point
inside the interval (i.e. one that was not previously available due to the discrete budgets).
Let δ = Bj+11 − Bˆ1 > 0. All five cases of Lemma 9 map into only three cases.
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Figure 11: Equilibrium bids at γs(Bˆ1).
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− Case 0: b1 = b2 = 0. We set bˆ1 = bˆ2 = 0 as well. (a)+(b)+(c)+(d) trivially hold.
− Case 1 (both L and W): b1 = b2 > 0. Note that according to both Cases 1L and 1W
of Lemma 9, Bj
′
1 +B
j′′
1 − 2B
j
1 + 2
−(k−1) = 0.
We define bˆ1 = B
j′′+1
1 − Bˆ1, and bˆ2 = max{0, Bˆ1 − B
j′+1
1 + δ} (see Fig. 11). Thus
(a)+(b) hold by construction. (c) holds even when bˆ2 > 0 since
bˆ1 − bˆ2 = B
j′′+1
1 − Bˆ1 − (Bˆ1 −B
j′+1
1 + δ)
= Bj
′′+1
1 − 2(B
j+1
1 − δ) +B
j′+1
1 − δ = B
j′′+1
1 − 2B
j+1
1 +B
j′+1
1 + δ
= Bj
′′
1 + 2
−(k−1) +Bj
′
1 + 2
−(k−1) − 2Bj1 − 2 · 2
−k + δ = δ > 0.
As for (d), for any b′2 > bˆ1, we have
Bˆ1 + b
′
2 > Bˆ1 + bˆ1 = B
j′′+1
1 ,
i.e. we get a point outside the interval B
j′′
, so black cannot gain by bidding higher.
White cannot gain by bidding b′1 ∈ [bˆ2, bˆ1) since Bˆ1− b
′
1 ≤ Bˆ1− bˆ2 = B
j′+1
1 − δ ∈ B
j′
,
i.e. in the same budget interval.
− Case 2 (both L and W): b2 = b1 + ǫ. We set bˆ1 = Bˆ1 − B
j′
1 and bˆ2 = B
j′′+1
1 − B
j+1
1 .
Clearly (a)+(b) holds. (d) also holds since (as in Case 1) it is impossible for −i∗ = 1
to deviate and stay in the same interval, and lowering the winning bid of i∗ = 2 still
reaches interval Bj
′′
(k − 1). It remains to show (c).
In both Cases 2L and 2W of Lemma 9 we have
Case 2L: Bj1 −B
j′
1 + ǫ = b1 + ǫ = b2 = (B
j′′
1 + ǫ)−B
j
1 ⇒ B
j′′
1 +B
j′
1 − 2B
j
1 = 0;
Case 2W: Bj1 −B
j′
1 = b1 + ǫ = b2 = B
j′′
1 −B
j
1 ⇒ B
j′′
1 +B
j′
1 − 2B
j
1 = 0.
Then we get that similarly to Case 1,
bˆ2 − bˆ1 = B
j′′+1
1 −B
j+1
1 − (Bˆ1 −B
j′
1 )
= Bj
′′+1
1 −B
j+1
1 − ((B
j+1
1 − δ)−B
j′
1 ) = B
j′′+1
1 +B
j′
1 − 2B
j+1
1 + δ
= Bj
′′
1 + 2
−(k−1) +Bj
′
1 − 2B
j
1 − 2 · 2
−k + δ = δ > 0,
as required.
One immediate corollary is that as long as the resolution is high, the Bottom Equilibrium
induces the same mapping from budget intervals to outcomes (since for any ǫ the mapping
is the same one as in the continuous case). In the continuous case we may have (infinitely)
many PSPEs, all with the mapping µ, but neither of them can be referred to as “the Bottom
Equilibrium.” We thus say that a PSPE γ ∈ Γ∗(G,−) is a Bottom Equilibrium if µγ = µ,
i.e. if it induces the same outcome as BE(G, ǫ) for some high resolution ǫ.
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6. From Bidding Games to Combinatorial Bargaining
There are two ways we can think of bidding games. First, we can look for games that
inherently have budgets and sequential bidding. While there are some examples of scenar-
ios that arguably fit into this model, typically the incentive structure and/or the bidding
structure is quite different (see Section 6.4 below, and the Related work section). A more
promising way is to think of the sequential bidding process as a mechanism that is designed
to increase cooperation and welfare among a pair of players in various scenarios.
6.1. Sequential scrip bargaining
Definition 13. A 2-player sequential scrip bargaining (SSB) is a tuple F = 〈K, v1, v2, τ〉,
where: K is the set of items (k = |K|); vi : 2K → R is the value function of agent i ∈ N ;
and τ is a permutation over items K.
Intuitively, items K are offered for sale according to order τ , and in each turn agents
bid for the current item. To complete the game we need to describe the bidding rules. As
expected, we assign a budget Bi to each agent; the highest bidder in each turn pays her bid
to the other agent, and decides who gets the item. In case of a tie we treat agent 1 as the
winner.
This bargaining mechanism seems like a close reminiscent of sequential auctions (Gale and Stegeman,
2001; Bae et al., 2007). However, typically in the auction literature items are auctioned in
a first- or second-price auction where the highest bidder pays the (first or second) bid to the
seller; and utilities are quasi-linear. In particular, an agent’s utility depends not just on the
allocation, but also on the amount of money the agent paid for her items (see Section 8.1).
SSBs differ from these standard auctions in two ways. First, while we use the first-
price auction rule, the higher bidder pays the other player, rather than paying to the seller,
highlighting that this is a bargaining mechanism rather than an auction. Second and more
importantly, the budget Bi is “scrip money” and has no value outside the game, thus the
utility of i from a bundle Si ⊆ K is vi(Si), regardless of how much of the budget the agent
spent.
6.2. SSBs are Binary Bidding Games
Proposition 14. Every SSB with k items has an equivalent bidding game structure over a
binary tree of height k, and vice versa.
By “equivalent to” we mean that for any resolution ǫ, there is a one-to-one mapping be-
tween strategy profiles in the original and induced game, that preserves utilities. Intuitively,
we can describe any SSB as a binary tree where any internal node at depth k′ corresponds
to an allocation of the first k′ items. Note that this mapping is independent of the initial
budget allocation, the budget resolution, and even of the bidding rule.
Proof. In the first direction, given F = {K, v1, v2, τ}, let Kd ⊆ K be the set of first d
elements of K (according to τ). We construct a bidding game G = 〈S, s0, T, g, u1, u2〉 as
follows. Let Sd be the set of all 2d possible bi-partitions of Kd for d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, and
S =
⋃
d≤k Sd. Note that these are partial allocations ofK to the two players. s0 is the empty
allocation (the unique member of K0). Every state can be written as s = (K1,K2) ∈ Sd,
where Ki is the set of items held by player i in state s. There are two states accessible from
s: either player 1 or player 2 get item τ(d + 1). Thus g(s) contains exactly two states in
Sd+1. The set of terminals T coincides with Sk, i.e. all full partitions of K. Finally, for
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every t = (K1,K2) ∈ T , we set ui(t) = vi(Ki). Thus G is an impartial binary tree of height
k, which is clearly equivalent to F .
In the other direction, suppose we are given a binary bidding gameG of height k. W.l.o.g.
G is a balanced tree: if it is in DAG form, we can clone every node with several incoming
edges, along with its subtree; if some branches are shorter than k, we extend them in the
trivial way: replace each terminal t at depth k′ < k with a balanced binary subtree of height
k − k′, all of whose leaves are identical to t.
Now we have a balanced tree of height k. For every internal node, arbitrarily label one
child as “left” and the other as “right”. We construct an SSB F = 〈k, v1, v2, τ〉 as follows.
Let τ be the identity permutation over K = [k]. We identify any path from the root s0 to a
terminal t with a partition (K1,K2) of K where K1 contains all levels d s.t. the left child
was selected, and K2 contains all other levels (i.e., where the right child was selected). Note
that any K ′ ⊆ K appears in exactly one terminal t′1 as K
1, and in exactly one terminal t′2
as K2. We set vi(K ′) = ui(t′i). Thus the set of allocations in F coincides with the set of
paths in the original game G.
For example, the game Gmaj (Sec. 2.1) coincides with a sequential scrip bargaining over
three identical items, where each agent assigns a value of 1 to bundles of size two or more,
and 0 otherwise.
Since SSBs are essentially equivalent to bidding games on binary trees, an immediate
corollary of Theorem 7 and Prop. 14 is the following. For a set of items K, let TP (K) be
the set of Pareto-efficient allocations of K among two players.
Theorem 15. Let F = 〈K, v1, v2, τ〉 be a sequential scrip bargaining, and let ǫ be some high
budget resolution. Then 〈F, ǫ〉 has a Bottom Equilibrium γ, s.t. µ = µγ is a monotone and
surjective mapping from Bǫ to TP (K).
As we mentioned in the introduction, the set of items K need not be a collection of
physical items. We next consider some applications of SSBs.
6.3. Applications for SSB mechanisms
Multi-issue voting. Consider a set of voters, voting over k binary issues (Winter, 1997;
Lacy and Niou, 2000; Lang and Xia, 2009). Here the voters (who are the players) have a
complete (weak) preference order over the 2k outcomes, but need not attribute cardinal
utilities to them. It is known that when preferences are unrestricted, either truthful or
strategic voting may lead to the selection of a Pareto-dominated outcome. Voting on the
issues sequentially provides a partial solution, but Pareto-dominated outcomes may still be
selected (Lacy and Niou, 2000). While our model only applies for two voters, it provides
strong guaranties of Pareto-efficiency, regardless of the agenda or the structure of prefer-
ences. In particular, a Condorcet loser is never selected, and the Condorcet winner is always
selected if it exists.
Arbitration. For two self-interested parties, a bidding game can be used as an arbitration
mechanism that reaches an efficient outcome, and also allows a natural way to take into
account parties of different importance, or weight. As a concrete example, we can think of
the Democrats and the GOP bargaining over the various clauses of the Healthcare Act, or
some other reform. The initial budget of each party can be set, say, based on its number of
seats. Arbitration mechanisms for two parties (not necessarily in a combinatorial setting)
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have been widely studied in the literature (Sprumont, 1993; Anbarci, 2006; De Clippel et al.,
2012).
Theminimal satisfaction test (MST) (De Clippel et al., 2012) is an ordinal fairness crite-
rion, that is satisfied if the selected outcome is above the median outcome in every player’s
preference order. That is, every player weakly prefers the selected outcome to at least
half of all possible outcomes. De Clippel et al. studied several sequential mechanisms,
and showed that three of them—The Alternate-Strike mechanism (Anbarci, 2006), the Vot-
ing by Alternating Voters and Vetoes mechanism (Sprumont, 1993), and the Shortlisting
mechanism—each implement some Pareto-efficient outcome that satisfies MST.
SSB and fair arbitration mechanisms. Consider the following parametrized extension of the
MST requirement. We say that an outcome t satisfies the (α1, α2)-satisfaction test, if each
player i weakly prefers t to at least ⌈αi|T |⌉ outcomes.
Proposition 16. Let 〈G, ǫ〉 be a bidding game over a full binary tree, then any PSPE
outcome satisfies the (B1, B2)-satisfaction test.
In particular, for equal budget we get that the outcome satisfies the minimal satisfaction
test of De Clippel at al. (2012).
Proof. We will prove that there is a strategy for player 1 that guarantees an outcome weakly
preferred to ⌈B1|T |⌉ outcomes, and likewise for player 2 and ⌈B2|T |⌉. Since any equilibrium
outcome is at least as good as the maximin outcome, this entails the proposition.
Given G and B1, we define a zero-sum game structure G′, that is equivalent to G except
for the utility functions. We set u′1(t) = 1 if t is weakly preferred to at least ⌈B1|T |⌉
terminals, and −1 otherwise; and set u′2 = −u
′
1. Thus each player can either ‘win’ or ‘lose’
in every terminal. Note that if B1|T | is an integer, then there are exactly |T | −B1|T |+1 =
(1 − B1)|T | + 1 winning nodes, and B1|T | − 1 losing nodes. Otherwise there are ⌊B1|T |⌋
losing nodes, since the next one is weakly preferred to all of them plus itself, i.e. to ⌈B1|T |⌉
terminals. Thus the number of losing nodes is exactly ⌈B1|T |⌉ − 1.
According to Lazarus et al. (1996), the Richman value R(s) of a node in a zero-sum
win/lose game, is the minimal value s.t. any B1 > R(s) guarantees a victory for player 1.
Lazarus et al. show that R(s) equals exactly to the probability that player 1 loses in the
corresponding “spinner game” of G′ (the same game only turns are taken at random rather
than by bidding).
This probability is easy to compute. Since G′ is a zero-sum game, at each node, white
(weakly) prefers one child and black prefers the other. W.l.o.g, white always prefers the
right child and black always prefers the left. Thus if players take random turns, they reach
a terminal that is selected uniformly at random from T . We conclude that
R(s0) = Prt∼Uniform(T )(u
′
1(t) = −1) =
|{t : u′1(t) = −1}|
|T |
=
⌈B1|T |⌉ − 1
|T |
< B1,
which means that a budget of B1 is sufficient to guarantee a victory to player 1 in G′. By
definition of G′, player 1 can guarantee an outcome in G that is weakly preferred to ⌈B1|T |⌉
outcomes. The proof for player 2 is symmetric.
The SSB mechanism has the additional property of implementing the entire set of Pareto-
efficient outcomes. As the proposition shows, every such outcome that is attained under a
given budget allocation, satisfies the parametrized MST.
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Communication complexity. Suppose that Alice and Bob each hold private information
a ∈ A and b ∈ B, respectively. They can exchange arbitrary messages sequentially in some
predefined order. Given a function f : A×B → {0, 1}, the communication complexity of f
is the total number of bits Alice and Bob must exchange so that at least one of them knows
f(a, b) with certainty (Yao, 1979).
Communication complexity in games was studied mainly in the context of equilibrium
computation, where a and b are the utility functions of players in some game, and f is some
property of the equilibrium of this game (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2004; Hart and Mansour,
2010). However, for an SSB with k items, the size of the valuation function of each player
is already exponential in k (in the general case), so there is no much hope to compute an
equilibrium with little communication.
We have a much more modest requirement. Let H = 〈Γ,Ψ, h〉 be a 2-player game form,
where Γ = Γ1 × Γ2 is the set of valid pure strategy profiles, and Ψ is the set of possible
outcomes, and h(γ1, γ2) ∈ Ψ is the outcome of playing strategies γ1, γ2 in H .
Definition 14. The playing communication complexity of H is the number of bits players
need to communicate so that at least one of them knows h(γ1, γ2).
In our case, Ψ = 2K contains all possible allocations of K among the two players, and
H is some mechanism the players use to determine the allocation.
For example, in the simple mechanism where players each choose sequentially an item
from K until all items are selected, there are k rounds, and the communication required
in each round is log(k) bits to specify which item. Thus the playing communication com-
plexity of this mechanism is O(k log(k)) (even though the strategies players use may be
complicated).
On the other hand, consider the Shortlisting mechanism (De Clippel et al., 2012). The
mechanism has two rounds where player 1 first marks the 2k−1 outcomes that she prefers
to all others, and then player 2 selects among them. Clearly revealing the full strategy γ1
to player 2 takes a number of bits that is exponential in k, and there does not seem to be
a more efficient way to find h(γ1, γ2). The other mechanisms in (De Clippel et al., 2012)
suffer from a similar problem.10
Note that given an order τ over items, the SSB F (K, τ) is a valid allocation mechanism
that maps any pair of strategies γ = (γ1, γ2) to an allocation µγ ∈ 2K .
Proposition 17. For any order τ , the playing communication complexity of SSB is O(k2).
Proof. An SSB has k rounds. In each round, each player needs to submit a bid, and the
winner decides on whether to take or give the current item. For any constant resolution
R, there are R2k possible budgets (and thus possible bids). So log(R2k) = O(k) bits are
sufficient to specify the bid. One additional bit is sufficient to specify the decision on the
item. Thus in total each player is required to transfer O(k2) bits in order to play her
strategy.
SSB is the first mechanism that guarantees efficiency, fairness, and low playing commu-
nication complexity. Thus SSB may be considered as a feasible and desirable mechanism
for combinatorial bargaining/arbitration when the playing parties are asymmetric.
10Recall that these mechanisms were not designed for combinatorial valuations so this is not surprising.
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Zero-sum games. In a zero-sum game, player 1 gets an outcome that beats B1|T | outcomes,
if and only if player 2 gets an outcome that beats B2|T | outcomes. Thus by Prop. 16 the
set of outcomes and the utility functions define the (unique) PSPE outcome completely,
regardless of the tree structure.
6.4. Other games
Consider any (impartial) game in tree-form. If the tree is not binary, we can modify it
by recursively breaking decision nodes to a subtree of binary decisions. Then we can divide
a large or continuous budget among the players, and let them play the new bidding game. If
players adhere to the Bottom Equilibrium, then the initial budget partition will determine
the final outcome (from TP (G)). Thus we can get a good outcome even in games where
playing by turns would lead to a poor outcome. In particular, with proper initial budgets
we can implement the outcome with maximum social welfare, maximum Egalitarian welfare,
etc.
Centipede games. One class of games that falls under the conditions of Theorem 7, is that of
Centipede games (Rosenthal, 1981). Such games are a notorious example to how rationality
leads players to end up in poor outcomes. Under random turn there are still Centipede games
where players always choose to finish early, even though staying in the game is eventually
significantly better for both.
Nevertheless, in our game setting there is a PSPE where players are guaranteed to
continue until they reach one of the Pareto-efficient outcomes (the last two leaves).
Nash bargaining game. The Nash bargaining game (Nash, 1950) for two players is typically
described by a (convex) set of feasible outcomes F in the plane, whose boundary forms
the Pareto-efficient frontier, and a status-quo point q. Given F and q, we can think of an
extensive-form bargaining game, where players start from q and at each state (point of the
grid) they can either “go right” (increase the utility of player 1) or “go up” (increase the
utility of player 2). The terminal states are the outcomes along the Pareto frontier. In this
case it is clear that every outcome is Pareto-efficient (as this is how we defined the terminal
states), but the properties of monotonicity and Pareto-surjective are still interesting. The
(unique) PSPE induces a generalized solution concept for the Nash bargaining game (a point
on the Pareto frontier for any budget allocation).
A natural question is how the PSPE solution—in particular for the case of equal budgets—
compares with other solution concepts such as the Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975). We note that there is
much interest in non-cooperative implementations of various bargaining solutions, e.g. (Moulin,
1984).
To answer our question, we first modify the game tree described above, by complementing
each leaf (a point on the Pareto frontier) to a subtree with identical leafs, such that all leafs
are at the same depth. Clearly this does not change the equilibria of the game—it just
means the game continues for a few more redundant rounds after the outcome is already
determined. Since the SSB induced by a Nash bargaining game is ordinally-zero-sum (as all
terminals are on the Pareto frontier), binary, and complete, it follows from Proposition 16
that when the budget is equally partitioned, the realized outcome is reached when players
make the same number of moves. In other words, if we normalize q to the origin (0, 0), then
both players have the same utility (or the closest approximation to same utility), which
coincides with the Egalitarian, or proportional, solution (Kalai, 1977).
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7. Computational Issues
In this section we elaborate on the algorithmic considerations in computing the Bottom
Equilibrium. The key contribution in this section is Algorithm 3, presented in Page 44.
We also implemented the algorithm in Matlab (along with code to generate simple binary
bidding games), and will share the code upon request.
Proposition 18. Let G be a binary bidding game structure. Algorithm 3 computes a profile
γ that is outcome-equivalent to a Bottom Equilibrium of 〈G,−〉. Moreover, Algorithm 3
runs in time |S| · poly(|T |) = poly(|S|).
Before showing the full proof, we explain the intuition. How can we even represent
the equilibrium efficiently, if at any node there are infinitely many budgets to consider (or
exponentially many in k, with discrete high resolution)? The answer lies in monotonicity.
Since we can order all reachable terminals, and the outcome is monotone in the budget
of player 1, we only need to find the cutoff points in the interval [0, 1] where the next
terminal becomes the outcome. There can be at most |T | − 1 such cutoff points, and the
main challenge is to show: (a) that they can be computed efficiently from the cutoff points
of both children; and (b) that for every budget between two given cutoff points, we can
efficiently compute some bids that reach the correct equilibrium outcome.
Proof. We saw that at any level k budget interval B
j
(k), the equilibrium bids in all B1 ∈ B
j
1
reach the same level k − 1 intervals (which we previously denoted by B
j′
(k − 1),B
j′′
(k −
1)), although they may reach different budget points. Our algorithm only computes this
mapping, i.e. from j to j′ and j′′, and then assigns arbitrary bids that reach those intervals
from Bj1. These bids may not be stable themselves, but they contain enough information to
reconstruct the equilibrium bids from any B1 ∈ B
j
1 according to Theorem 13.
There are three differences between Algorithm 2 (see Page 15) and Algorithm 3: (a) the
fast algorithm only computes the equilibrium in specific budget points (zlr), rather than for
any possible budget B ∈ Bǫ (or even any B
j
1(k)); (b) when black deviates, the fast algorithm
increments the bid by a quantity larger than ǫ; (c) after computing the equilibrium at all
critical budget points, the fast algorithm “filters” some points out, and does not add them
to the description of the PSPE. In contrast to ǫ in Algorithm 2, the exact size of δ is not
important, as long as it is sufficiently small (anything below 2−height(G)−1 would suffice).
We need to show that despite those differences we get the same equilibrium outcome,
i.e., the same mapping µ : [0, 1]→ T (G).
The a’th budget interval is the union of several consequent subintervals of size 2−k.
Formally, [Fs(a), Fs(a+ 1)) =
⋃
2kFs(a)≤j<2kFs(a+1)
B
j
.
We start by showing (b), i.e. that by bidding b′2 = b1 + δ or
b′′2 = min{B1 − Fs1(a1 − 1), Fs2(a
′
2 + 1) − B1 − δ}, the same equilibrium is reached. We
first argue that b′′2 > b1 (so black indeed takes). Since B1− b1 ≥ Fs1 (a1), and Fs1 is strictly
increasing, clearly B1 − Fs1(a1 − 1) > b1.
Similarly, B1+b′2 ∈ [Fs2 (a
′
2), Fs2 (a
′
2+1)) by definition of fs2 . Thus Fs2(a
′
2+1)−B1−δ >
b′2 − δ = b1. We conclude that b
′′
2 = min{B1 − Fs1 (a1 − 1), Fs2(a
′
2 + 1)−B1 − δ} > b1.
Next, note that by bidding b′2 or b
′′
2 , black reaches the same budget interval a
′
2 in s2.
The problem with just setting b′′2 = Fs2(a
′
2 +1)−B1 − δ, is that this may prevent a further
deviation by white, that would have been possible after a lower increment. That is, we
may reach an equilibrium that is not the lowest-bids equilibrium. However, if white has a
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deviation after black, then we only care if she has a deviation that brings her all the way
to the next budget interval a1 − 1 in s1—otherwise black would deviate back to a′2 with
another δ increment and so on. Therefore constraining b′′2 ≤ B1−Fs1(a1− 1) would prevent
this problem by always allowing white to bid the same. In other words, it guarantees that
a′′1 = a
′
1.
As a concrete example, consider such an ascending auction in Fig. 12, for B1 = 0.4.
Whenever black increases his bid b′′2 , it should be to the next point among b
′′
2 = Fs2(2) −
B1 − δ = 0.2− δ, b′′2 = B1 −Fs1 (1) = 0.4, and b
′′
2 = Fs2(3)−B1 − δ = 0.6− δ, since if there
is any deviation, the auction will eventually reach this point. The corresponding remaining
budget B1 + b′′2 for each of the three options is marked by d1, d2 and d3, respectively. Note
that d2 and d3 both belong to the same budget interval of s2, but skipping d2 may result in
looking over an equilibrium where white bids all of B1 and wins.
We now turn to show (a).
By induction, the budget between any consecutive critical points [al, al + 1) yields the
same outcome in sl, and likewise for sr. Fix some r, l and let B1 ∈ [zlr, zlr+), where
zlr+ = min{zl′r′ : zl′r′ > zlr}. We argue that whether white or black win in (s, zlr), the
winner reaches the same next state s′ and with the same remaining budget as from (s,B1).
The reason is the same as in the proof of Theorem 7(B) and of Theorem 13 and we do not
repeat it.
It is left to show (c), i.e. that no information is lost when filtering the (|T |+ 1)2 critical
points. Due to monotonicity, T is sorted, thus U contains the first index of every unique
entry in T . The filtering removes redundant parts of the equilibrium, as there are at most
|T | points where the outcome changes. Thus we only consider these points.
Finally, we consider the complexity of the fast algorithm. After filtering, the size of the
lists Fs, T ∗s , A
1
s, A
2
s is at most |T | each. With every deviation, either a1 strictly decreases or
a2 strictly increases, and thus there can be at most 2|T | deviations. The heaviest part in
computing a deviation is calculating fsi . Since |Fsi | ≤ |T | a naïve computation is linear in
|T |. Therefore Ascending − Auction() runs in O(|T |2). It is called at most |T |2 times in
every internal node, thus the total complexity is O(|S| · |T |4) = O(|S|5).
7.1. Compiling small DAGs from succinct valuations
Suppose we are given a sequential scrip bargaining, with some succinct representation of
the value functions vi. While we can apply Proposition 14 to construct an equivalent bidding
game, the naïve construction would yield a complete binary tree of height k. In particular,
the number of nodes |S| would be exponential in k. In the worst case, there is not much
we can do. For example, if buyers assign distinct utilities to exponentially many bundles of
items, then any bidding game must contain this number of terminal states. Also, if |T | is
fixed, but merely computing an optimal partition of K is NP-complete, then it must also
be NP-hard to construct an equivalent succinct bidding game (if such a game even exists).
This is since constructing the tree would in particular require us to efficiently generate all
|T | outcomes, and one them is the optimal partition (we just check all of them).
Additive valuations. We first solve a simple case, where valuations are additive, i.e., vi(S) =∑
j∈S vi(j). Suppose that we sold the first 4 items out of k, whose values to agent 1 are
2, 2, 4, and 3. Then the agent does not care if she currently has the first two items or just
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Figure 12: The top and bottom lines show the budget intervals in both children, where Fs1 =
(0, 0.2, 0.7) (say, for the left child), and Fs2 = (0, 0.6). Any budget maps to a unique interval in each
child. E.g., fs1(0.3) = 2 since 0.3 ∈ [Fs1(2), Fs1(3)). Note that the rightmost interval always ends at
1. The middle line shows all potential cutoff points (before filtering) in node s: in increasing order,
(zlr)lr = (0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.65, 0.8, 0.85, 1). For example, zlr = 0.4 =
0.2+0.6
2
is obtained
for l = 2, r = 2, as shown in the figure. The points marked by dj are the only deviations that black
needs to consider, where d1, d3 correspond to the the right edge of s2 intervals (minus δ), and d2
corresponds to the left edge of s1 interval (marked with ∗).
the third. If the other agent is also indifferent between these partial partitions, then we can
represent them with a single state.
We can generalize this observation using a dynamic programming technique, similar to
the one used for Knapsack problems (RE and Dreyfus, 1962).
Proposition 19. Given an additive SSB F with integer valuations, there is an equivalent
binary bidding game with |S| ≤ (k + 1) ·M states, where M = (v1(K) + 1) × (v2(K) + 1).
Further, such a bidding game can be constructed efficiently.
Proof. We assign a state sj,m1,m2 for every j ∈ {0, . . . , k} and every pairm1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , v1(K)},m2 ∈
{0, 1, . . . , v2(K)}. The initial state is s0,0,0. For every j = 1, . . . , k, we go over all states in
level j − 1. We connect each such state sj−1,m1,m2 with two children: sj,m1+v1(τ(j)),m2 , and
sj,m1,m2+v2(τ(j)). That is, either agent 1 or agent 2 gets the j’th item (according to order
τ). We then add all new children to level j.
Note that any state at level j corresponds to a partition of the first j items. Finally,
we identify the terminals T with the last level k (full partitions), and assign ui(sk,m1,m2) =
mi.
Using an implementation of Algorithm 3 in Matlab, we computed the PSPE prices for
an SSB with k identical items. When the initial budget is the same (0.5 for each player),
we witness a clear pattern increasing prices over time. This pattern breaks when we start
from different initial budget allocations.
Weight-based games. A similar technique can be applied in games where the valuations are
not additive, but still base on some additive notion of weight. We say that vi is weight-
based if every item has a fixed weight wj , and there is a function fi : N → R, s.t. vi(S) =
fi(
∑
j∈S wj). Note that without further constraints any function is weight-based, as we can
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make sure that each bundle has a different total weight. However if weights are bounded
then we get a succinct representation for a subclass of functions.
This idea can be further generalized. We say that vi is multi-weight-based if every
item has a vector of fixed weights (w1j , . . . , w
q
j ), and there is a function fi : N → R, s.t.
vi(S) = fi(
∑
j∈S w
1
j , . . . ,
∑
j∈S w
q
j ). As a concrete example, suppose that the items are
computing machines, each with some properties like storage, memory, bandwidth, etc. The
value of a set of machines to a client depends only on the total storage, total memory, and
total bandwidth, regardless of how these resources are allocated across among the machines.
Note that additive SSBs are a special case of multi-weight-based SSBs, where there are
two dimensions. f1(S) =
∑
j∈S w
1
j , f2(S) =
∑
j∈S w
2
j . Note however that we allow fi to be
a completely arbitrary function, and it does not even need to be monotone.
Proposition 20. Given a multi-weight-based SSB F , there is an equivalent bidding game
with |S| ≤ (k + 1) ·M2 states, where M = (w1(K) + 1)× · · · × (wq(K) + 1). Further, such
a bidding game can be constructed efficiently.
Proof. Construction is very similar to Proposition 19. We identify each state at level j with
a tuple
〈
j,m11,m
1
2, . . . ,m
q
1,m
q
2
〉
. where mri now tracks the total dimension-r weight of the
bundle owned by agent i. We link each state to its two children by adding all respective
weights of item τ(j) to the bundle owned by one of the agents.
Finally, in every terminal t = s〈k,m11,m12,...,mq1,mq2〉 (state that corresponds to a full allo-
cation), we set u1(t) = f1(m11, . . . ,m
q
1), u2(t) = f2(m
1
2, . . . ,m
q
2).
As a corollary from Propositions 18 and 20, a PSPE in multi-weight-based and in additive
SSBs can be computed efficiently. That is, in time that is polynomial in the number of items
and in the total weight/value.
Voting with single peaked preferences. If voters have a strict preference order over all 2k
possible outcomes of the game, there cannot be a succinct representation, since we will
need 2k terminals. However consider the following scenario. Each voter as an “ideal” point
t∗i ∈ {0, 1}
k. The utility of any other outcome only depends on the Manhattan distance from
t∗i , i.e. on the number of coordinates in which t, t
∗
i differ. We may also assign a different
weight to each coordinate, so that ui(t) = −
∑
j≤k wij |t
∗
i (j)− t(j)|.
This scenario has a simple mapping to an SSB of additive items: The value to i of every
coordinate on which t∗1, t
∗
2 differ is wij . If bidder i “buys” coordinate j she may set it to
t∗i (j). The value of every coordinate j on which t
∗
1(j) = t
∗
2(j) can be arbitrary. The bidders
will not compete on these coordinates, as it is Pareto-optimal to set t(j) = t∗1(j).
Pathfinding. The items in a pathfinding problem over a graph, are pairs s = 〈location, time〉.
In a naïve representation, all pairs would be allocated, and the value of a bundle of pairs to
an agent, would be the optimal legal path from source to target that this bundle contains.
If our game states would each represent a subset of such pairs, we would quickly reach
an exponential blowup. We modify the auction so that a state 〈location1, location2, time〉
means that each agent i is in locationi at time, after reaching there from the start. Thus
we do not auction states (tuples) in an arbitrary order, but rather construct an alternative
bidding game. We present an outline of the construction.
We start from s0 = 〈start1, start2, 0〉, and link each state s = 〈location1, location2, time〉
to two other states: the first is just a copy of s, and the second is one of the legal moves
from s, for example 〈location′1, location
′
2, time+ 1〉, where location
′
i is either a neighbor
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of locationi or locationi itself, and it does not hold that location′1 = location
′
2. We keep
enough copies of s to exhaust all legal moves (at most the number of locations, squared).
The terminal states are those where time =MaxT ime, or both agents reached their targets.
After the first agent reaches her target, we record her time. The negative utility to each
agent in a terminal is her time.
Thus, in total we have at most MaxT ime2 × |locations|4 states including all copies.
8. Discussion and Related Work
We presented a simple and intuitive mechanism—sequential scrip bargaining—that im-
plements the full range of Pareto-efficient allocations of items to two agents with arbitrary
valuation functions. Further, our mechanism can be applied to efficiently and fairly set-
tle other combinatorial bargaining problems that involve two parties. The pure subgame-
perfect equilibrium can be computed in time that is polynomial and the size of the full
game tree/DAG, and for many classes of valuations, polynomial in the size of the succinct
representation.
8.1. Related Work
Richman games. Lazarus et al. (1996; 1999) were the first to systematically analyze bidding
variations of zero-sum games. They coined the term “Richman games” in honor of David
Ross Richman, the original inventor, and considered games with an infinitely divisible unit
of budget. A Richman game is a directed graph (possibly with cycles) with two terminal
nodes (say, black and white), and a full play is a path starting from some node and ending
in a terminal node. The goal of each player is to end the game in her own terminal. The
main focus of Lazarus et al. was on the following question: “in every node, what is the
minimal fraction of the budget that will guarantee a victory for the white player?” The
Richman function assigns a unique value to every node R(s), which is the average of the
Richman values of its lowest and highest neighbors (normalizing the values of white and
black terminals to 0 and 1, respectively). Lazarus et al. show that the Richman function
exists on every graph and is also unique if the graph is finite. It turns out that R(s) marks
the critical budget: if B1 > R(s) then white can force a victory when starting from node
s; if B1 < R(s) then black can force a victory. Moreover, R(s) is also the exact probability
that black wins in a game where instead of bidding, the player in each turn is selected by a
fair coin toss (see (Peres et al., 2007) for more details on random-turn games).
Lazarus et al. further study other variations of bidding games by applying different
auction rules. In particular, in the Poorman game the highest bidder pays the bank rather
than to the other player, so the total budget shrinks with every step.
Develin and Payne (2010) extended the theory of zero-sum bidding games in several
important aspects. In most recreational games, such as Tic-Tac-Toe, Chess, and Checkers,
white and black can perform different actions when in the same board state s, thus games
are not necessarily impartial. Develin and Payne extended some of the previous results of
Lazarus et al. to partial games such as Chess and Tic-Tac-Toe. In addition, they considered
discrete bids, and the implications of various tie-breaking schemes. To demonstrate their
approach, Develin and Payne showed a complete solution of bidding Tic-Tac-Toe for every
possible initial budget. Interestingly, in the continuous case the Richman value of the initial
state in Tic-Tac-Toe is 133/256 ≡ 0.519, which means that an advantage of ∼ 4% in the
initial budget is sufficient to guarantee a victory. In a related work, Payne and Robeva (2008)
developed a near-optimal algorithm for playing bidding Hex. In a very recent paper, Larsson
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and Wästlund (Larsson and Wästlund, 2017) explore some intricacies of partiality, and in
particular show examples of Chess endgames where no value exists.
Negotiations and bargaining. In typical bargaining problems there is a conflict deal that is
implemented if agents cannot reach agreement (Nash, 1950), or utility depends on time until
agreement (Rubinstein, 1982; Fatima et al., 2004). In our mechanism there is no conflict
deal or discounting and thus it is hard to compare the protocols directly.
Yet, our Bottom Equilibrium can be intuitively thought of as a combinatorial version
of the minimal sufficient concession principle, that is often employed by agents in the
monotonic concession protocol (Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1996): at every node the winner
makes the minimal concession (in terms of future bargaining power) that allows her to win
the round.
Sequential combinatorial auctions. “Standard” sequential auctions (with quasi-linear util-
ities rather than budgets) have been studied by several researchers (Gale and Stegeman,
2001; Rodriguez, 2009; Leme et al., 2012). These papers focused on particular classes of
value functions (unit-demand, submodular, etc.) and generally demonstrated that while
pure equilibria exist, they may be substantially inefficient for some of these classes. Ineffi-
cient outcomes occur even in 2-buyer, complete information auctions (Bae et al., 2007).
All-pay rules and Colonel Blotto. Powell (2009) models a particular sequential game between
an attacker and a defender (a sequential Colonel Blotto game). This game is essentially a
specific general-sum bidding game over a degenerated tree (a path), where the utility in every
match—the success probability—is determined by the invested resources of each party. Our
model does not cover this particular game due to several differences. First, in our model
the utility is only determined in the leaves rather than accumulated over the entire path;11
More importantly, the utility in every match depends exactly on the “bids” (investments) of
both parties, and both parties discard their bids (an “all-pay” auction).
Another all-pay variation of bidding games was studied in (Menz et al., 2015), who
developed a fast algorithm for computing the optimal strategy. Note that the optimal
strategy under all-pay rules must be mixed, i.e. use probabilistic bids.
Sequential auctions with budgets. Lastly and closest to our work, Huang et al. (2012) study
particular bidding game, in which two agents use an initial budget to bid over identical items
that are sold sequentially. This is essentially a sequential scrip auction mechanism, yet their
model is not strictly a special case of ours, as they add some additional refinements.12 While
we believe that the models are very close, the focus on a particular value function (which
makes the game an almost-zero-sum game) allows Huang et al. to provide an accurate
characterization of the allocations under PSPE as a function of the budgets. Our results
are qualitative in nature, but apply to arbitrary utility functions.
Huang et al. prove that item prices decrease over time. Curiously, we observe (empir-
ically) that prices increase.13 One interpretation is that the result of Huang et al. is an
11This would be a minor difference if the number of outcomes was finite.
12In (Huang et al., 2012) players pay to the bank rather to one another (the Poorman variation), and also
try to minimize spent budget as a secondary goal.
13Using a fast implementation of our algorithm in Matlab, we computed the PSPE prices for an SSB with
k identical items. When the initial budget is the same (0.5 for each player), we witness a clear pattern of
increasing prices over time. This pattern breaks when we start from unequal initial budget allocations.
39
artifact of the auction rule, as in the Poorman version the total amount of money is also
decreasing in each round.
8.2. Variations
By changing the auction rules, different types of bidding games arise. For example,
an all-pay auction may better describe various real world scenarios like security games,
sport matches, and R&D competitions. However these games typically do not have a pure
equilibrium point, and are more difficult to analyze (see Related work section for specific
games that have been studied). Using a second-price rather than a first-price auction to
determine the winner should not have a large effect, since in equilibrium the bids will always
be very close.
An important question is whether our results still hold when the “Poorman game” version
is played, i.e. when the highest bidder pays the bank rather than the other player. Since in
the continuous case the strategy at a given node only depends on the fraction B1/B2, there is
a one-to-one mapping between strategies in the continuous Richman and Poorman variations
of a game. We would thus expect our main results (e.g. Pareto-optimality of the Bottom
Equilibrium) to hold, but this would require a separate proof. Also computational properties
may be far less convenient. The Poorman version has one important advantage over the
Richman version—the game definition naturally extends to any number of players. It is an
open question whether a Pareto-optimal PSPE exists in a binary game for more than two
players, either when playing together, or when connected in a network of bilateral bargaining
connections (Chakraborty et al., 2009). We believe that the answer to this question is
negative, since there are simple Poorman games with three players that are non-monotone.
8.3. Future Work
Other than studying the variations mentioned above, there are several questions that
remain open. One natural direction is how changing the order in which items are offered (or
the agenda in sequential voting) affects the induced equilibrium. It is known that in general
bargaining problems the agenda can strongly affect the outcome (Fershtman, 1990; Inderst,
2000). While the agenda may also affect the outcome in our model, it is possible that there
are classes of valuations where all orders yield a similar outcome in PSPE. For example,
from Proposition 16 the order of issues in zero-sum bargaining games does not matter.
More important questions arise when non-determinism enters. For example, we conjec-
ture that our results (both existence and optimality) also hold under random tie-breaking,
and that such a randomized mechanism in fact leads to better fairness guarantees. On the
other hand random tie-breaking can exponentially increase the number of possible outcomes
and thus efficient computation may not be possible.14 In addition, agents’ valuations them-
selves may be private and sampled from some distribution, and we are interested whether
similar results regarding efficiency and monotonicity apply in games without complete in-
formation.
Finally, experiments with bargaining games in the spirit of (Weg et al., 1990; De Clippel et al.,
2012) may reveal whether the game-theoretic analysis is a good proxy to the actual behavior,
and whether our mechanism can improve welfare and satisfaction in practice.
14We thank Michael Simkin for verifying this assertion.
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ALGORITHM 3: Find-PSPE-fast(G)
Initialize(F , T
∗
, A
1
, A
2
, I);
// See description of Initialize() for explanation of variable
roles.
for every leaf t: do
// In the leaves there is only one budget interval, which
is all the range [0, 1].
Ft ← (0) ; // An array of length one
T ∗t ← (t);
// Traverse nodes bottom up:
for every node s in post-order do
Let sl, sr be the two children of s;
For every al = 1, . . . , |Fsl |+ 1 and ar = 1, . . . , |Fsr |+ 1, set zlr =
Fsl (al)+Fsr (ar)
2 ;
Sort {zlr}lr in increasing order;
// zlr are the only “critical points” of the budget in state
s. The equilibrium bids for any point in the interval
[zlr, zlr+) reach the same budget interval in the next state
(either sl or sr).
Initialize global empty lists F, T,A1, A2;
for every l, r (in increasing order of zlr) do
Set B1 = zlr ; // Budget of player 1
// Compute the Bottom equilibrium of the current step for
budget B1 (and thus for all its interval)
〈〈s1, a1〉 , 〈s2, a2〉 , t〉 ← Ascending-Auction(G, s,B1);
Append(F,B1); Append(T, t);
Append(A1, 〈s1, a1〉); Append(A2, 〈s2, a2〉);
U ← T (1);
for ℓ = 2, 3, . . . , |T | do
if T (ℓ) 6= T (ℓ− 1) then
Append(U, ℓ);
// Write down the equilibrium strategies in s:
Fs ← Filter(F,U); T ∗s ← Filter(T, U);
A1s ← Filter(A1, U); A
2
s ← Filter(A2, U);
return γ ←
〈
F , T
∗
, A
1
, A
2
〉
;
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Function Initialize(F , T
∗
, A
1
, A
2
)
for every node s ∈ S: do
Initialize global empty lists Fs, T ∗s , A
1
s, A
2
s;
// A variable X is a list with one entry per state, i.e.
X = (Xs)s∈S.
// Intuitively, Fs contains all budget cutoff points. Fs(1) = 0
always. For every a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |Fs|}, all budgets
B1 ∈ [Fs(a), Fs(a+ 1)) are equivalent, where Fs(a′) = 1 for all
a′ > |Fs|. We use fs : [0, 1]→ {1, 2, . . . , |Fs|} as the inverse of Fs,
where fs(B1) is the index of the budget interval in s that
contains B1. Formally, fs(B1) = max{a : B1 ≥ Fs(a)}.
// T ∗s (a) ∈ T is the outcome that will be reached from state
(s, Fs(a)).
// Ais is the strategy of i, where A
i
s(a) = 〈s
′, a′〉.
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Function Ascending-Auction(G, s,B1)
b1, b2 ← 0 ; // Initialize bids
al ← fsl(B1);
ar ← fsr (B1);
s1 ← argmaxj∈{l,r} u1(T
∗
sj
(aj)); // Child preferred by white
s2 ← argmaxj∈{l,r} u2(T
∗
sj
(aj)); // Child preferred by black
if s1 = s2 then
// White wins with bid 0, and plays s1. Reaches budget
interval indexed by a1 (either al or ar).
a1 ← fs1(B1);
t1 ← T ∗s1(a1);
return 〈〈s1, a1〉 , 〈s1, a1〉 , t1〉;
repeat
// Compute outcome under current bids b1, b2:
a1 ← fs1(B1 − b1); t1 ← T
∗
s1
(a1); // Current outcome
a2 ← fs2(B1 + b2);
b′2 ← b1 + δ; // Try a deviation of black
a′2 ← fs2(B1 + b
′
2); t
′
2 ← T
∗
s2
(a′2) ; // Outcome after deviation
if b′2 > 1−B1 or t
′
2 2 t1 then
// Black cannot or would not raise. In this budget
interval (at least B1 = zlr and below zlr+), white wins.
The bid b1 is set so that B1 − b1 falls in the budget
interval indexed by a1 in s1.
return 〈〈s1, a1〉 , 〈s2, a2〉 , t1〉;
// A higher bid of black with the same outcome as b′2:
b′′2 ← min{B1 − Fs1(a1 − 1), Fs2(a
′
2 + 1)−B1 − δ};
b′′1 ← b
′′
2 ; // Try a deviation of white
a′′1 ← fs1(B1 − b
′′
1);
t′′1 ← T
∗
s1
(a′′1 );
if t′′1 1 t
′
2 then
// White would not raise (Note that b′′1 ≤ B1 by definition
of b′′2 so white can always raise). In this budget
interval, black wins and plays s2. Reaches budget
interval indexed by a′2.
return 〈〈s1, a1〉 , 〈s2, a′2〉 , t
′
2〉;
b1 ← b′′1 ; b2 ← b
′′
2 ;
until;
Function Filter(L,U)
Initialize L0 as an empty list;
for j = 1, . . . , |U | do
ℓ← U(j);
Append(L0, L(ℓ));
return L0
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